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ABSTRACT

This study describes the antecedents and consequences of the direct involvement
of boards in forming the strategies of the organizations they serve. If boards are involved
directly and early in the strategic decision making process rather than being held at the
periphery, board members may become important assets to their organizations as strategy
makers beyond their limited contributions as monitors or advisors. By providing a look
inside the “black box” of decision making in board rooms, this research addresses a gap
in the strategy and board literatures and has important practical implications for
executives and board members who are interested in utilizing their boards to the greatest
advantage for their organizations.
Board members and chief executive officers who are currently making strategic
decisions in a hospital context detailed their involvement in the decision making process
in their responses to surveys designed for this study. Utilizing structural equation
modeling for analyzing these responses, this study indicates that board members who
bring human capital, social capital, and Board Capital (human and social capital in
concert) to the board room are more likely to participate early in the strategic decision
making process by raising or clarifying issues, generating or evaluating alternatives, or
choosing strategies rather than only coming into the process at the end to review and
accept or reject the recommendations of the top management team. And when board
members are directly involved in forming strategy, the strategic decisions are more likely
to be implemented and the implemented strategies are more likely to result in positive
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financial outcomes. Thus, boards as strategy makers impact the strategic decision
making process and the organization in important ways.
This study has shown that there are identifiable antecedents and positive
consequences of boards acting as strategy makers.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

“One of the great paradoxes of the twentieth century is that while
enormous progress was made in understanding how economies in general
operate and in improving the management of corporations, relative little
was learned about the way in which the people who are by law
responsible for the oversight of the corporations, upon which so much of
prosperity is based, actually made their decisions.”
-- Leblanc and Gillies, Inside the Boardroom (2005: 245)

Executives and scholars have traditionally viewed the primary duties of boards of
directors to be monitoring and advising the chief executive officer and top management
team (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009). As either monitors or
advisors the board acts independently of the organization’s executives in a supervisory
role. Scholars have directed attention to the composition of boards, particularly in terms
of the status of board members as “insiders” or “outsiders,” that enhances their
independence. Several organizations where boards failed in their monitoring
responsibilities (Enron for example) received much attention in the popular press. As a
result of this increased public attention to the accountability of boards and executives, the
Sarbanes-Oxley legislation was enacted in 2002. But beyond the legislated requirements
relating to audit committee composition and financial reporting for publicly traded
corporations, some have called for greater involvement of the boards of all types of
organizations in the organization’s strategic decision making processes in order for
boards to more effectively perform their monitoring and advising functions (e.g. Chait,
Ryan, & Taylor, 2005; Charan, 2005; Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007; Nadler, 2004).
1

When boards are involved in developing the organizational strategies from the beginning,
they will likely have greater depth of understanding of both the strategies and the
organizational context when they are ultimately asked to pass judgment on those
strategies (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009).
Even more importantly than improving boards’ abilities to perform their
traditional monitoring and advising roles more effectively, the direct involvement of
boards in the various stages of the organizational strategic decision making process
increases the opportunity for organizations to capitalize on their boards as resources for
building competitive advantage in their increasingly complex organizational
environments (Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Since board members
bring their perspectives and expertise from their own fields to the boardroom, their
perspectives are potentially quite valuable in the process of determining the strategic
direction of the organization. These varied perspectives and fields of expertise add
breadth and depth to the resources available for sensemaking in the face of the
organization's complex environment. When brought to bear in identifying problems,
clarifying issues, generating and evaluating alternatives, and making choices—critical
steps in the organizational strategic decision making process (Russo & Schoemaker,
2002)—the perspectives and areas of expertise of board members are valuable resources
for forming organizational strategy.
This study describes the antecedents and consequences of the direct involvement
of boards in forming the strategies of the organizations they serve. If boards are involved
directly and early in the strategic decision making process rather than being held at the
periphery, board members may become important assets to their organizations as strategy
2

makers beyond their limited contributions as monitors or advisors. This research is of
interest because it addresses a gap in the strategy and board literatures, and it has
important practical implications for executives and board members who are interested in
utilizing their boards to the greatest advantage for their organizations.
If boards are potentially important resources as strategy makers rather than acting
only as monitors and advisors, what factors contribute to boards being involved in the
strategic decision making process? I propose that three constructs are the primary
contributing factors that make boards capable of participating effectively in the strategy
formation process: the human capital, the social capital, and the Board Capital that boards
bring to the strategic decision making process. Human capital is the knowledge and
skills individuals develop as a result of their experiences, education, and training (Becker,
1993; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009). Social capital refers to the resources that are
available to individuals as a result of their networks of relationships with others
(Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Board Capital is the combination of human capital and
social capital (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).
For boards to be more capable of being involved in forming organizational
strategy, the most important sources of human capital are the experiences of board
members with decision making at the board level and their experiences in their work and
educational fields. Board experience comes from board members serving on boards
currently or in the past. Boards are at the apex of their organizations and are ultimately
accountable for all organizational decisions and actions. This is a significant
responsibility, and board members who have more experience with this board level of
responsibility are in a better position to assume that responsibility. When boards are
3

comprised of members with more board-level experience, boards have a stronger
foundation for participating in making the strategic decisions for which they will be held
accountable. The perspectives board members bring from their work experiences and
educational training are also particularly cogent. The training and work experiences of
board members in functional areas such as marketing, finance, or management and their
experiences with various strategic options in their home firms or other organizations
increases the diversity of perspectives in the boardroom when strategic options are
considered. A great deal of research on groups has shown that diversity of perspectives
can be beneficial for producing effective decisions (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Bourgeois,
1985; De Dreu & West, 2001; Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996; Hoffman & Maier, 1961;
Jackson, 1992; Nemeth, 1986; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992).
For boards to be more capable of being involved in forming organizational
strategy, the most important sources of social capital are the relationships developed from
the networks among board members and the collaborative relationships between boards
and their CEOs. The relationships among board members develop from serving on
boards currently and in the past as well as serving on the focal board. Collaborative
relationships between boards and their CEOs develop from interactions both inside and
outside the boardroom. When board members are comfortable in offering advice freely
to their CEOs and when CEOs are comfortable in seeking the advice and counsel of their
boards, the stage is set for a greater and more complete exchange of information. When
the relationships among board members and between board members and the CEO are
based on friendship rather than on business acquaintanceship alone, the friendship ties
will further improve the conditions for exchanging information as well.
4

When boards possess both human capital and social capital in concert, this Board
Capital makes them even more capable of being resources to their organizations in
forming strategy.
If boards are involved directly in forming organizational strategy, what are the
potential benefits to their organizations? I propose that one outcome of board
involvement in forming strategy is the greater likelihood that strategic decisions will be
implemented because the board members are more fully informed about the choices as a
result of their participation in making them. A second outcome of board involvement in
forming strategy is that strategic decisions will be better decisions as a result of
capitalizing on the resources of the perspectives of board members. Better decisions are
effective decisions, and positive financial results for the implemented strategic decisions
are evidence of effective decisions. Since these decisions are strategic (i.e., they have
long-term impacts that affect the entire organization), the positive financial outcomes of
these implemented strategic decisions will be expected to flow through to the financial
performance of the organization as a whole.
With this overview of the study, the following chapters delve into the substance of
the study in greater depth. Chapter 2 presents the foundational literature for the
constructs incorporated in the study. Chapter 3 describes the study research questions,
hypotheses, and details of the research design. Chapter 4 presents the findings from the
data analyses. Chapter 5 provides the discussion and practical implications, and Chapter
6 is the conclusion.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE
“In the corporate governance debate, all arguments ultimately converge on the
role of the board of directors” (Gilson & Kraakman, 1991: 873). Researchers have
directed attention at two roles in particular—boards as monitors and boards as advisors.
However, interest is growing in the possibility that to effectively serve their organizations
boards must assume a different, much larger role: boards as strategy makers. As strategy
makers, boards become a valuable resource for the organizations they serve. Specifically,
boards are a resource because they bring human capital and social capital to the strategymaking process. When these forms of capital are effectively utilized, the organization
prospers.
This chapter describes how a board can be seen as a resource and how that
resource might best be employed. Thus, this chapter will review current thinking on
resources and resource dependence. Second, the chapter will define and elaborate on
resources in the form of the human capital, social capital, and Board Capital (i.e., the
combination of human and social capital) board members potentially bring to an
organization. Third, this chapter argues why and how these resources can be used to
formulate strategy. Finally, this chapter will argue that when board resources are used to
formulate strategy the organization will enjoy a competitive advantage that will produce
enhanced performance outcomes. Figure 1 depicts the proposed conceptual model of the
relationships among the antecedents of the involvement of boards in forming
organizational strategy and the consequences of this involvement. All figures and tables
may be found in the Appendices.
6

Boards as Resources
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 163) note that “when an organization appoints an
individual to a board, it expects the individual will come to support the organization, will
concern himself with its problems, will favorably present it to others, and will try to aid
it.” Boards are often comprised of attorneys, financial experts, executives from other
industries, and community representatives who are resources to the organization because
of the expertise, skills, experience, and connections they possess. Resource dependence
theory focuses attention on the abilities of board members to provide resources of various
kinds to the organization and also to create linkages with individuals and organizations
outside of the organization. Since board members are boundary spanners, they are
important in the organization’s ability to access resources and sources of information that
are available—possibly exclusively—in the organization’s external environment, thereby
reducing the uncertainty the organization faces because of its need to access critical
resources from outside its boundaries (Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
The resources board members bring to boardrooms are substantial and valuable to
organizations which are dealing with uncertain, often turbulent, environments. The
various backgrounds and experiences of board members mean they bring various kinds of
expertise and knowledge to the organization (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Certo, 2003;
Gales & Kesner, 1994). Board members have expertise in law, finance, marketing,
human resource management, medicine and so forth as a result of their educational and
work experience in various fields. They also possess valuable knowledge about the
community and general environment within which the organization operates. This
expertise and knowledge enhances the ability of board members to provide valuable
7

advice and counsel to the organization (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Ford-Eickhoff,
Plowman, & McDaniel, 2011; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Westphal, 1999).
As boundary spanners, board members create linkages with important
stakeholders (Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 1999; Hillman, Keim, & Luce, 2001; Hillman,
Zardkoohi, & Bierman, 1999), linkages which may not otherwise be available to the
organization if it relied instead strictly on employees for its connections. These linkages
among individuals and the organizations they represent create channels for
communicating information among organizations (Certo, 2003; Davis, 1991; Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978). These channels of communication then facilitate the organizational
processes for identifying and tapping into strategic opportunities. These channels also
transmit signals of organizational legitimacy to external stakeholders with the important
potential outcomes of improving relationships with customers or investors (Certo, 2003;
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
The basic logic of the resource dependence view is that organizations need access
to critical resources beyond their internal resources in order to prosper. Although the
resource dependence view has been relatively less explored in research on boards
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003), the logic of the resource dependence approach has been
supported in several studies (e.g., Birnbaum, 1984; Boeker & Goodstein, 1991; Hillman,
2005; Hillman, Canella, & Harris, 2002; Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000; Lester,
Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Cannella, 2008; Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988; Pearce & Zahra,
1992; Provan, 1980; Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993). As one example, in accordance with the
logic of the resource dependence view former government officials would be expected to
possess knowledge and networks of contacts which would be valuable to public
8

corporations. Supporting this logic, Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Cannella (2008)
found that public corporations were more likely to invite former government officials to
serve on their boards under circumstances which improved the potential for the former
government officials to bring valuable knowledge and contacts to the board: when they
had a longer tenure of government service, greater breadth of experience in government
service, and more recent government service.
Of particular importance to the current study, the results of some studies in the
resource dependence stream of research have shown a relationship between boards as
providers of resources and firm performance (Boyd, 1990; Dalton, Daily, Johnson, &
Ellstrand, 1999; Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1992; Pearce & Zahra, 1991; Pfeffer, 1972).
From the resource dependence perspective, larger boards are in a position to provide
more resources to the organization because of the greater number of directors bringing
their expertise to the board and the more extensive linkages with other organizations they
represent. Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand’s (1999) meta-analysis of studies that
included over 20,000 companies indicated that there is a significant positive relationship
between board size and organizational financial performance. This relationship held for
both large and small firms, for different performance measures, and for boards with
proportionately more outside directors or inside directors. And Hambrick and D’Aveni
(1992), looking at the issue from the opposite vantage point (i.e., a lack of access to the
resources boards provide will be detrimental to firm performance) found that their sample
of firms had faced difficulties in obtaining and retaining outside directors in the five years
prior to filing bankruptcy. These firms were unable to tap into the resource linkages of
outside directors, resources which may have been crucial for the firms’ survival.
9

Thus boards can be seen as providing many kinds of valuable resources in the
form of knowledge, experience, and networks of relationships to organizations, and these
resources are crucial to the organization prospering—or perhaps even surviving.
Boards as Human Capital

Human capital is the combination of knowledge and skills individuals possess as a
result of their experiences, education, and training (Becker, 1993; Kor & Sundaramurthy,
2009), and it is a valuable resource for a board. In addition to individual board members
possessing and using their knowledge and skills on behalf of the organization, boards are
comprised of a number of individuals and therefore incorporate a potentially broad range
of knowledge and experiences when these individuals are combined as a group. Stiles
(2001: 647) noted that the human capital present on the board represents “a major source
of competitive advantage, not only through the individual capabilities and skills of
individual directors, but also through the unique interrelationships and set of routines
which form the dynamics of the board.” These dynamics include: (1) effort norms that
improve director preparation and participation; (2) cognitive conflict involving
leveraging different perspectives by balancing the positives and negatives of the presence
of differing perspectives; and (3) cohesiveness that is linked to task performance (Forbes
& Milliken, 1999).
Board members’ knowledge and skills enhance their ability to scan and interpret
the environment, make choices based on their interpretations, and help management deal
with the complexities and uncertainties surrounding strategic decisions (Rindova, 1999).
The knowledge systems and repertoire of skills of top managers and board members are
10

based on their prior professional experiences (Bailey & Helfat, 2003; Carpenter &
Westphal, 2001; Certo, 2003; Hambrick & Fukotomi, 1991; Kor, 2003), and these
experiences help shape their frame of reference, perceptions, and biases (Kor &
Sundaramurthy, 2009; Tsoukas, 1996; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001). Human capital in
the form of knowledge and skills developed from experience serving on boards and
experience in the principal occupations of board members are particularly relevant to
understanding board and organizational performance (Kosnik, 1987, 1990; Morck,
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; Olson, 2000).
Board Experience
The knowledge and skills gained from experience serving on boards are an
important part of the human capital board members bring to the organization. Boards
deal with issues of strategic importance by virtue of their position at the top of the
organization, and experience with making decisions that will impact the organization as a
whole and that will have long-term consequences is beneficial when board members must
make decisions about strategic issues the organization faces. By virtue of this experience
with making strategic decisions, members with board experience have seen that decisions
at this level of the organization often involve a substantial passage of time—sometimes
years—between making a decision and its full implementation. Experience with serving
on a board also means that members have worked with other board members, individuals
at the same level of responsibility and authority as they, in negotiating the decision
making process. Furthermore, board experience means that members are accustomed to
working with CEOs in a supervisory capacity rather than only as the colleagues or
11

subordinates of CEOs, and this type of supervisory experience is valuable to board
members in the same way that supervisory experience is valuable to managers of people
at any level of the organization.
The importance of board experience is evident in the relationships found in the
literature between longer board tenure and outcomes such as organizational proclivity to
make strategic changes, improved revenues, and greater attention to stockholders’
interests. For example, Golden and Zajac (2001) argued that boards with very low
average tenure would have less of an information base from which to draw and therefore
would be less inclined to recommend strategic changes. They further argued that boards
with very high average tenure may be more committed to the status quo. The results of
their study of hospitals indicated an inverted u-shaped relationship in which increasing
the average tenure of board members for low-tenure boards increases the likelihood of
strategic change but decreases the likelihood for high-tenure boards, supporting their
hypothesis. Longer board tenure has also been found to be associated with greater total
revenues in not-for-profit colleges (Olson, 2000) as well as to larger gifts from the board
members themselves to their not-for-profit organizations (O’Regan & Oster, 2005). And
the average tenure of outside directors is positively related to greater board attention to
stockholders’ interests in the form of resistance to greenmail (Kosnik, 1990).
Of particular interest here, longer board tenure has been associated in the
literature with board members perceiving that they have a greater ability to contribute to
board discussions of strategic issues (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001) and with board
members attending more board meetings and devoting more time to board activities
(O’Regan & Oster, 2005). Human capital in the form of board experience increases the
12

capabilities of board members to participate fully in the strategic decision making process
because they are able to draw upon the knowledge and skills developed through other
board-level decision making experiences and apply them to new contexts and issues.
These board-level decision making capabilities then enhance the potential for boards to
contribute directly to formulating strategy rather than acting only in the capacities of
monitors or advisors.

Work and Educational Experience
The knowledge and skills gained from experience in the board members’ primary
occupations are also an important part of the human capital they bring to the boardroom.
In their seminal article Hambrick and Mason (1984: 199) argued that an executive’s
functional background will be related to the strategies the firm employs. They noted this
“functional-track orientation may not dominate the strategic choices an executive makes,
but it can be expected to exert some influence.” Scholars have embraced this idea, and
functional background is now the most widely cited demographic characteristic thought
to affect corporate strategy (Jensen & Zajac, 2004).

Since the board is responsible for

hiring the chief executive officer, the board is important in determining the functional
background and past strategic experiences for successor CEOs of the focal firm
(Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001; Zajac & Westphal, 1996) and in determining the
successor’s strategy for the focal firm once hired (Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001). For
example, the literature reveals that CEOs with finance backgrounds prefer strategies
involving higher levels of diversification and make more acquisitions (Jensen & Zajac,
2004); therefore a board which prefers to see the organization pursue a diversification or
13

acquisition strategy might influence the organizational strategic direction by selecting a
CEO based on his or her background in finance.
In addition to influencing strategy through the choice of CEOs, the notion that
work experiences influence strategic choices can be applied to board members as well as
to CEOs. It has been argued that outside directors rely to an even greater extent on their
prior experiences in making strategic decisions since they have less organization-specific
knowledge than the CEO (Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001). Westphal and Fredrickson
(2001) showed that directors often favor strategies for the focal firm that are like the
strategies they have experience in formulating and implementing as executives in their
own home firms. For example, directors who have formulated and implemented a
strategy of extensive diversification at their home firms are likely to advocate for
diversification strategies at the focal firm when they interpret parallels in the two firms’
capabilities and industry conditions. Furthermore, Westphal and Fredrickson (2001)
argue that executives learn from the strategic experiences of firms for which they serve
on the board as well. So the experiences with strategies in their home firms and in firms
for which they serve on the board become reference points or benchmarks when directors
are determining their strategic choices for the focal firm.
The presence of business experience is a primary rationale given by many
organizations for inviting individuals to serve on their boards (Daily, Certo, & Dalton,
1999; Dalton et al., 1999; Kesner, 1988) in order to capitalize on the full range of
intellectual capital available to the firm. The educational and training experiences of
board members are also important contributions to the knowledge and skills they bring to
these organizations. Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella (2009: 97) argue that it is
14

reasonable to expect that the functional work experiences along with other experiences of
individuals will form lenses through which they see problems and solutions. The
correspondence between functional experiences, psychological preferences, and strategic
choices may occur because individuals are drawn to functional areas that fit their
personalities or aptitudes, and then individuals become inculcated with a particular mode
of thinking typical of that functional area. Since executives tend to perceive problems
and generate solutions based on their past experiences—both successes and failures—
executives with similar functional backgrounds tend to develop similar perspectives on
problems and solutions because of this common lens (Jensen & Zajac, 2004).
Since boards are comprised of a number of individuals, members with different
backgrounds often serve on the board together. Diversity in the perspectives of the
individuals on boards has both negative and positive aspects. On the negative side,
theory suggests that diversity in perspectives will lead to difficulty in exchanging
information because of the different perspectives, vocabularies, paradigms and objectives
(Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Chatman & Flynn, 2001; Kirkman, Tesluk, & Rosen, 2004;
Lichtenstein, Alexander, Jinnett, & Ullman, 1997; Lincoln & Miller, 1979; Pelled,
Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999). Diversity of perspectives may lead to lower behavioral
integration (Carpenter, 2002; O’Reilly, Snyder, & Boothe, 1993) and to less social
integration among the members, resulting in discord (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, &
Elliot, 1991; Hambrick, et al., 1996). The lack of common decision-making routines will
slow the decision making process (Carpenter, 2002; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998), and,
since members do not have “shared world views” (Carpenter, 2002), this may lead to
lower consensus on goals, competitive methods, and environmental perceptions.
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On the positive side, however, theory suggests that diversity of perspectives will
increase the cognitive resources of the board, enhancing the board’s capabilities to be
innovative in solving problems. Diversity of perspectives broadens the field of view and
expands networks of contacts, increasing the ability of board members as a group to
evaluate issues on multiple fronts and enhancing the opportunities to take appropriate
actions (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Bourgeois, 1985; De Dreu & West, 2001; Hambrick, et
al., 1996; Hoffman & Maier, 1961; Jackson, 1992; Nemeth, 1986; Wiersema & Bantel,
1992). Greater task-related conflict can be beneficial when considering complex
decisions (Carpenter, 2002; Jehn, Chadwick, & Thatcher, 1997; Williams & O’Reilly,
1998) and can lead to productive exchanges of information among members as they
negotiate a decision which incorporates the various perspectives of the members
(Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1985; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001; Williams &
O’Reilly, 1998). More perspectives will provide the group with greater breadth and
depth of information, a greater variety of skills, and greater “sociocognitive horsepower”
(Carpenter, 2002: 277) which may lead to improved analysis of strategic options and
strategy formulation (Alexander, Fennell, & Halpern, 1993; Bourgeois, 1985; Daily,
Certo, & Dalton, 1999; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Jackson, Brett, Sessa, Cooper,
Julin, & Peyronnin, 1991). Nemeth (1986: 23) suggests that “[m]inority viewpoints are
important, not because they tend to prevail but because they stimulate divergent attention
and thought. As a result, even when they are wrong they contribute to the detection of
novel solutions and decisions that, on balance, are qualitatively better.”
The literature provides evidence regarding the impact of diversity of work and
educational backgrounds in top management teams and boards. For example,
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heterogeneity in functional background and educational level of the top management
team relates positively to innovativeness (Bantel & Jackson, 1989) and changes in
organizational strategy (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Murray (1989) found that
occupational heterogeneity of the top management team was negatively related to shortterm performance in the oil industry firms in his sample but not in the food industry
firms, indicating that the impact of occupational heterogeneity may be different in
different industries. For example, heterogeneity may be more beneficial in novel,
complex situations and in turbulent environments and homogeneity may be more
beneficial in more routine situations and stable environments (Carpenter, 2002; De Dreu
& Weingart, 2003; Hambrick, et al., 1996; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Jackson, 1992). In
studies focusing on boards, Goodstein, Gautam, and Boeker (1994) found fewer strategic
changes were associated with occupationally diverse boards, but Golden and Zajac
(2001) found that occupational heterogeneity was linked to strategic change in a
curvilinear manner, with increasing heterogeneity predicting increased strategic change
up to a point before turning negative. Ford-Eickhoff, Plowman and McDaniel (2011)
found that hospitals with boards that are characterized by a greater breadth of expertise
are more likely to exhibit an external focus in making strategic choices. And Carpenter
and Westphal (2001) found that the number of functional areas in which directors had
prior experience significantly predicted the level of board monitoring of management’s
strategic decision making in both stable and unstable organizational environment
contexts.
Similar to human capital in the form of board experience, human capital in the
form of work and educational experiences increases the capabilities of board members to
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participate fully in the strategic decision making process because they are able to draw
upon the knowledge and skills developed through those experiences and apply them to
issues the organization is currently facing. These work and educational backgrounds
then enhance the potential for board members to contribute directly to formulating
strategy rather than acting only as monitors or advisors.

Proposition 1: When board members possess human capital by virtue of
having board-level experiences, business experiences, and
educational/training experiences, they are more capable of participating
directly in forming organizational strategy.
Boards as Social Capital
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998: 243) define social capital as “the sum of the actual
and potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the
network of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit.” Social capital is
another origin of valuable resources for boards, resources that result from the networks of
relationships of the board members. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) further define the
social capital concept to be comprised primarily of three, interrelated dimensions:
structural, relational, and cognitive. The structural dimension involves the overall pattern
of connections among actors; that is, the presence or absence of network ties, the network
configuration in terms of density and hierarchy, and the existence of networks created for
one purpose but used for another. The relational dimension refers to the aspects of social
capital accruing from the relationships in these networks such as the development of
trust, norms, obligations, expectations, and identification with the group. The cognitive
dimension involves the shared interpretations, language and systems of meaning which
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result from shared experiences within stable, dense networks characterized by high levels
of interaction (Boisot, 1995; Orr, 1990). Scholars have suggested that individuals build
social capital by filling “structural holes” when they bridge the gaps between
disconnected others (Burt 1992) and by having strong ties with others in cohesive social
networks (Fukuyama, 1995). The notion that network ties provide members access to
resources is fundamental to the social capital concept (Adler &Kwon, 2002; Nahapiet &
Ghoshal, 1998), and thus organizations accrue social capital through members’ efforts to
develop their own individual social capital. Organizations clearly also benefit from their
members’ access to knowledge, information, and a sense of purpose (Cohen & Prusak,
2001).
Several important benefits of social capital at the organizational level have been
identified in the literature. Through the encouragement of cooperative behavior, social
capital facilitates innovative and flexible organization (Fukuyama, 1995; Jacobs, 1965;
Leana & Van Buren, 1999; Putnam, 1993), individual commitment to the greater good
and to the organization (Leana & Van Buren, 1999), the acquisition of skills and
knowledge (Podolny & Page, 1998), and greater coherence of action (Cohen & Prusak,
2001). Social capital based on high levels of trust may reduce the need for monitoring
processes (Portes, 1998; Putnam, 1993) and lower transaction costs both within the
organization and between the organization and its customers (Cohen & Prusak, 2001).
Strong norms of cooperation within the social network also reduce the need for formal
controls (Adler & Kwon, 2002) and help organizations weather volatile environments
through the sense of solidarity engendered among organizational members who are
committed to a shared mission and vision (Cohen & Prusak, 2001). And social capital is
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necessary for organizations to develop dynamic capabilities (Blyler & Coff, 2003; Dyer
& Singh, 1998) and facilitates entrepreneurship and product innovation (Chong &
Gibbons, 1997; Gabbay & Zuckerman, 1998; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998; Walker, Kogut, &
Shan, 1997).
Social capital is also important for the development of a particularly crucial
organizational resource: intellectual capital, or the knowledge and knowing capability of
organizations. It does this by affecting the conditions needed for knowledge exchange
and combination to occur (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Leana & Van Buren, 1999;
Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998: 252) note that “it is well
established that significant progress in the creation of intellectual capital often occurs by
bringing together knowledge from disparate sources and disciplines.” Norms valuing
diversity of perspectives, openness to criticism, and tolerance of failure have been shown
to be important in the creation of intellectual capital (Leonard-Barton, 1995). Social
capital, through its role in developing intellectual capital, is a pivotal component in the
organization’s ability to develop unique competitive advantage (Leana & Van Buren,
1999).
Although generally focusing on the positive consequences of social capital
(Portes, 1998), scholars have noted that social capital is not always beneficial. The same
strong norms and identification with others in a network which may result in improved
group performance may also limit the openness of network members to alternative ways
of doing things, producing a pathological “groupthink” (Janis, 1972; Leonard-Barton,
1995; Perrow, 1984; Turner, 1976).

A side effect of high levels of social capital may

be a restriction of access to diverse sources of ideas and information (Kor &
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Sundaramurthy, 2009; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998) or unthinking loyalty to shared beliefs
(Cohen & Prusak, 2001). As Powell and Smith-Doerr (1994: 393) put it, the “ties that
bind may also turn into ties that blind.” Therefore, organizations which make effective
use of social capital must constantly balance the benefits of social capital and its potential
downside (Boland & Tenkasi, 1995; Etzioni, 1996; Leonard-Barton, 1995; Nahapiet &
Ghoshal, 1998) in much the same way that the benefits of diversity of perspectives must
be balanced with the potential disadvantages.
Social capital in the form of networks of board members and a collaborative
relationship between board members and their CEOs are particularly relevant to
understanding board and organizational performance (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Kor
& Sundaramurthy, 2009).
Networks
The complex world today makes it impossible for any one individual to know
everything important for running any organization. Networks of relationships—although
they may have been created for other purposes—provide channels through which
information flows, reducing the costs involved in gathering information (Coleman, 1988).
Networks produce these efficiencies in information transfer by providing an information
screening and distribution process for the network members, transmitting information
sooner to network members than they would receive it without those contacts, and
providing the opportunity for members to exchange knowledge (Burt, 1992). Networks
are the “incubators” of collaboration and affect the range of information that may be
accessed by network members (Cohen & Prusak, 2001). By means of network
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connections, individuals may gain privileged access to information and opportunities as
well as social status if membership in the network is restricted (Burt, 1992; D’Aveni &
Kesner, 1993). Through these networks, individuals become connected not only directly
with other people who have the ability to help them but also indirectly with the resources
these contacts can provide through their own networks (Adler & Kwon, 2002).
Networks are valuable assets because of the access they provide members to
power, information, and knowledge. A sense of membership in the network comes from
learning what the network knows through sharing skills, language, and information
(Cohen & Prusak, 2001). These networks of relationships give rise to obligations and
expectations for actions in the future due to feelings of gratitude, respect or friendship
among members (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1990) These obligations and expectations
provide motivation for exchanging knowledge and acting cooperatively (Lewicki &
Bunker, 1996; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Furthermore, these norms, obligations, and
expectations may be important in the process of individuals identifying themselves as
part of a group, taking the values or standards of other individuals as their frame of
reference (Merton, 1968; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Tajfel, 1982).
Disparate sources of information and differences of opinion expand knowledge
bases, but meaningful communication among the diverse parties is an essential part of the
social exchange process. High levels of social capital are typically developed in contexts
with high levels of interaction and interdependence among people in which the linkages
are strong and reciprocal (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). High levels of interaction lead to
network members developing a common language, and sharing a common language
facilitates access to others and to the information they possess. Shared vocabularies bind
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members together and make conversing more efficient (Cohen & Prusak, 2001). This
shared language enables combining information from disparate sources (Boland &
Tenkasi, 1995) and also enables the formation of shared stories, powerful means of
communicating information among members and preserving rich meanings (Cohen &
Prusak, 2001; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).
The literature provides several insights about networks with respect to boards.
Whether individuals are asked to serve on a board is often a function of the personal
connections of the individuals with others in the business elite (Davis, 1993; Mintzberg,
1983) as much as the performance of the individuals as executives in their own firms
(Brickley, Linck, & Coles, 1999) and their performance in their roles as board members
of other firms (Coles & Hoi, 2002; Farrell & Whidbee, 2000; Westphal & Stern, 2007).
In a recursive manner, an individual’s position within this business elite is at least partly
determined by the directorships he or she holds (Allen, 1974; Davis, 1993; Koenig,
Gogel, & Sonquist, 1979; Porter, 1957). Since networks create channels through which
information flows, the network formed by overlapping memberships on different boards
of directors can be a mechanism for spreading techniques and innovations in governance
(Davis, 1991; Haunschild, 1994; Westphal, 1999) and the policies underlying strategic
decisions (Westphal, Seidel, & Stewart, 2001) from board to board. And longer tenure
on a board provides the opportunity to become familiar with other board members and
with the top management team, leading to the development of a common language (Kor
& Sundaramurthy, 2009) which facilitates the discussion of organizational issues and
strategies.
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Social capital developed from the networks of board members increases the
capabilities of board members to participate fully in the strategic decision making process
because they are able to tap into the channels of information their networks provide, at
the same time extending the information available for making strategic choices for the
organization and reducing the costs of accessing that information. Board members are
motivated to exchange information because of the expectations developed from their
participation in their various networks and their identification with other members of
these networks. And the shared languages that develop from interactions in their
networks enable combining information from disparate sources in new ways to benefit
the organization. In these ways, the networks of board members enhance the potential for
boards to contribute directly to formulating strategy.
Collaborative Relationship with the CEO
In addition to the social capital in the form of relationships of board members
with others in their networks, a collaborative relationship between the board members
and their CEO is evidence of social capital, particularly the relational and cognitive
dimensions of social capital. Trust is an essential ingredient for a collaborative
relationship to develop between boards and their CEOs. Trust involves confidence in the
good intent of others in the exchange process (Ouchi, 1981; Pascale, 1990; Ring & Van
de Ven, 1994) and belief in their competence and reliability (Giddens, 1990; Ouchi,
1981; Sako, 1992; Szulanski, 1996). Trust is a precondition for the development of
social capital because the essential connections among people will not form without some
level of confidence in the good intent of others. Personal contacts among people over
24

time provide opportunities for trust to grow as people evaluate how reliably others
behave and whether they seem well-intentioned (Cohen & Prusak, 2001).
Building social capital is a complex recursive process in which social capital is
both created and used. For example, in relationships where the parties trust one another,
they are more willing to cooperate in activities, and, as a result of successful cooperative
action, they develop higher levels of trust in one another (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam,
1993; Tyler & Kramer, 1996). Trust of others within those relationships may then lead to
the development of norms of cooperation, or “expectations that bind” (Kramer &
Goldman, 1995), so that people are more willing to interact, cooperate and exchange
information because that is the norm within those relationships (Fukuyama, 1995;
Gambetta, 1988; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Putnam, 1993, 1995; Ring & Van de Ven,
1992, 1994; Tyler & Kramer, 1996). The frequency and intensity of interactions provide
the opportunity for cooperating and exchanging information (Kor & Sundaramurthy,
2009), and these interactions also provide the opportunity for a sense of identification
with the group or organization to develop (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Nahapiet &
Ghoshal, 1998). The trust engendered when board members and CEOs are familiar with
one another mitigates the need for potentially dysfunctional impression management
efforts by CEOs (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003), and trust improves people’s ability to
deal with complexity and diversity in contexts of high ambiguity and uncertainty (Boisot,
1995; Luhmann, 1979).
Westphal and his colleagues have explored this notion of collaborative
relationships between boards and their CEOs extensively, and some of these studies have
focused on the outcomes of boards and their CEOs sharing a collaborative relationship.
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Westphal (1999) found that stronger CEO-director social ties lead to the board providing
more advice and counsel to the CEO, and this collaborative relationship between CEOs
and directors leads to higher firm financial performance. Gulati and Westphal (1999)
found that CEOs seeking advice and counsel from directors leads to strong cooperative
relationships, and these strong cooperative relationships between the CEO and directors
lead to increased likelihood of forming a joint venture alliance based on board interlocks
because the close relationships build trust and confidence among the parties. Westphal
and Fredrickson (2001: 1132), arguing that “new CEOs are primarily responsible for
implementing strategies conceived by the board,” found that boards selected successor
CEOs who had prior experience with strategies similar to the strategies employed by the
directors’ home firms. And McDonald, Khanna, and Westphal (2008) found that CEOs
were more likely to seek advice from other CEOs who are dissimilar from them in terms
of their functional backgrounds and social networks when the CEOs and their boards
have a collaborative relationship. This increased likelihood of CEOs seeking advice from
dissimilar others then leads to improved firm performance.
Social capital in the form of collaborative relationships between boards and their
CEOs increases the capabilities of board members to participate fully in the strategic
decision making process because the trust in the competence and good intentions of the
CEOs and board members involved in these collaborative relationships engenders a
greater willingness to cooperate and exchange information. With these collaborative
interactions with their CEOs, board members are more likely to have access to
organization-specific information—positive and negative—because of this greater
willingness to share information among the parties in the collaborative relationship. And
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board members are more likely to identify with the organization because of these
collaborative relationships as well. In these ways, these collaborative relationships
between boards and their CEOs enhance the potential for boards to contribute directly to
formulating organizational strategy.

Proposition 2: When board members possess social capital by virtue of
having extensive networks and collaborative relationships with their
CEOs, they are more capable of participating directly in forming
organizational strategy.
Boards as Board Capital
Boards are groups and therefore can benefit from pooling the resources provided
by their members: human capital (i.e., experience, expertise, reputation); social capital
(i.e., access to information and knowledge derived from networks of relationships); both
human and social capital (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009). For example, Kor and
Sundaramurthy (2009) describe how boards comprised of board members serving on
multiple boards and board members having firm-specific knowledge contribute to greater
board human capital and social capital simultaneously. Membership on multiple boards
exposes board members to a variety of strategic issues, problems and potential solutions,
giving them experience in dealing with diverse issues and increasing their human capital.
Social capital is also increased when board members are connected to many other board
members and executives as a result of their service on multiple boards. And board
members’ tenure on the focal board increases their firm-specific knowledge resulting in
higher levels of human capital. This tenure on the focal board also increases their
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opportunities to form connections with the other board members on the focal board
resulting in higher social capital.
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) refer to this combination of board members’ human
capital and social capital as Board Capital, depicted in Figure 2. They argue that the
ability of boards to provide resources in various forms to the organization hinges on their
Board Capital.
Board Capital—this combination of human capital and social capital—is
important above and beyond each form of capital considered separately. After all, boards
may be rich in human capital as a result of the backgrounds and experiences of board
members without being rich in social capital if members do not have extensive networks
with others. To illustrate, a board comprised of several research scientists who have great
expertise in their fields but who choose to live and work in isolation might enjoy high
levels of human capital but not social capital. Alternatively, boards may be rich in social
capital because of the extensive contacts of board members without necessarily being rich
in human capital. Again to illustrate, boards comprised of several affluent socialites who
have extensive social networks but who have little or no work experience might enjoy
high levels of social capital but not human capital. Boards rich in Board Capital are so
because they enjoy the benefits of both human capital and social capital. Such boards
ought to be even more capable when participating in the strategic decision making
process because they bring more total resources to a strategy-making event than do
boards benefiting from only one type of capital.
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Proposition 3: Board members possessing Board Capital (i.e., both
human and social capital) will be the most capable of participating directly
in forming organizational strategy.
Boards as Strategy Makers
The human capital and social capital resources board members bring to the
boardroom make board members capable of participating fully in the organizational
strategic decision making process rather than being relegated to the periphery as monitors
and advisors. Board Capital also means that boards are an important channel for
organizations to use to access information about their environments and the strategic
opportunities that exist there (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Fredman, 2002; Pfeffer,
1991; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The expertise, experience, and networks that Board
Capital represents are crucial resources for organizations to utilize in the process of
determining their strategic direction and put boards in the position to be important
contributors to this process (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Geletkanycz, Boyd, &
Finkelstein, 2001; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; Lorsch &
MacIver, 1989). Organizations which see their boards only as monitors or advisors are
not capitalizing on their boards as the valuable resources they are capable of being for
forming strategy for the organization. Tapping the board as a resource for forming
organizational strategy is of particular interest to researchers and practitioners alike
(Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella, 2009; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996; Judge &
Zeithaml, 1992; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Zahra & Pearce, 1989).
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The literature provides evidence that some—but certainly not all—boards are
significantly involved in determining the strategy of their organizations in a variety of
industries and in for-profit, not-for-profit, and international contexts. For example, Judge
and Zeithaml (1992) found that approximately 30 percent of the boards in a sample
drawn from hospitals, biotechnology firms, textile firms, and highly diversified Fortune
500 firms reported that the board worked with management to develop strategic choices.
Pearce and Zahra (1991) found that almost half of the boards in their sample of large
manufacturing and service corporations had significant power in making decisions about
corporate strategies. Similarly, Lee, Alexander, Wang, Margolin, and Combes (2008)
found that 60 percent of the hospital boards in their sample reported a high focus on the
board’s strategy/mission setting role. And in an international context, Iecovich (2004)
found that approximately 30 percent of the respondents in her sample of nonprofit
organizations in Israel reported the highest level of board involvement in deciding and
implementing strategic changes in programs and services.
Several studies focusing on how and when boards are involved in the strategy
formation process have found relationships between the characteristics of the members of
the board and the organizational strategic choices made. Much of this stream of research
focuses on board members as either “insiders” or “outsiders” to distinguish their level of
independence. Insiders are generally defined as current and former employees or
sometimes as individuals with any affiliations with the organization, and outsiders have
no such affiliations (Cochran, Wood, & Jones, 1985). Outside director representation has
been associated with the involvement of boards in making acquisition and restructuring
decisions (Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993), and the proportion of insiders on the board
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is negatively related to board involvement in the strategic decision making process (Judge
& Zeithaml, 1992). Outside director representation has also been associated with a
greater tendency to choose organizational diversification strategies (Hill & Snell, 1988),
lower strategic emphasis on research and development (Baysinger, Kosnik, and Turk,
1991; Deutsch, 2005; Hill & Snell, 1988) and greater emphasis on strict adherence to
environmental laws in order to avoid the costs associated with infractions (Kassinis &
Vafeas, 2002). Also, the arrival of new outside directors makes a firm’s decision to divest
a poorly performing subunit more likely (Shimizu & Hitt, 2005).
The strategic experience of outside directors in their home firms has been found
to be an important factor in determining the strategic direction of the focal organization,
evidenced by the board selecting a CEO who has experience with strategies similar to the
directors’ home firms and who then implements similar strategies in the focal
organization (Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001). Along those same lines, Haunschild
(1993, 1994) found the acquisition experience of directors in their home firms was
positively associated with acquisition activity in the focal firm.
When exploring how and when boards are involved in forming organizational
strategy, some scholars have focused on the capabilities of board members to be involved
in making strategic decisions. Carpenter and Westphal (2001) argued that experience on
other boards will likely affect the degree to which directors have suitable knowledge and
information in order to contribute meaningfully to strategy formation. They argued that
strategy implementation will be more important than strategy development in stable
environments, and therefore appointing directors who also serve on the boards of other
firms which follow similar strategies in similar contexts would increase the directors’
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abilities to contribute to strategic decisions in stable environments.

In contrast, in

unstable environments familiarity with different strategies in different contexts will likely
be more beneficial to the directors’ ability to contribute to strategic decisions. They
found support for these hypotheses in their study of outside directors of Fortune 1000
firms. Similarly arguing that knowledge of different technologies and skills in portfolio
management are needed to successfully make diversification decisions, Pearce and Zahra
(1992) found that greater outsider representation on boards was associated with greater
organizational diversification.
A few studies have explored the capabilities of board members to be involved in
strategic decision making from the perspective of the human capital or social capital they
bring to the board. For example, Kor and Sundarmurthy (2009) found in their study of
entrepreneurial firms in the U.S. that various forms of firm- and industry-specific human
capital and social capital represented on the board influenced the growth strategies of
these firms. Stevenson and Radin (2009) found that the social capital of board members
in the form of more prior relationships with other directors, more current ties with other
directors, and ties with members of a dominant coalition within the board was the biggest
predictor of the members’ influence on board decision making. They argued that the
strong ties among the board members may lead to higher levels of trust overall on the
board, and board members with more connections within the board then have greater
influence on board decisions. And Westphal and Milton (2000) found that directors who
were in the minority in terms of functional/industry/educational background, race or
gender relative to the board as a whole had more influence over board decision making
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when they had higher social capital as a result of strong social connections with majority
directors through common board memberships.
This literature reveals that research directed at the question of how boards impact
organizational strategy has provided evidence that boards have been involved in setting
strategic direction in a variety of contexts. However, board involvement in forming
strategy is a complex issue. There are three levels of board involvement in strategic
decision making: (1) approving/disapproving strategic decisions made by the top
management team; (2) shaping strategic decisions; and (3) directly deciding the content,
context, and conduct of strategy (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999). The first level is
associated with boards acting as monitors, and the second level is associated with boards
acting as advisors. When boards are involved at the third level and are directly forming
strategy, they are involved to a greater extent in making strategic choices than is the case
for either monitors or advisors—they are acting as strategy makers.
Adding to the complexity of the issue, there are stages in the strategic decision
making process including identifying the problem, clarifying the issues, generating and
evaluating alternatives, and making a choice (Russo & Schoemaker, 2002). When acting
as monitors or advisors, boards do not participate in these stages. Rather, the CEO and
top management team are involved in these stages in making decisions which will then be
presented to the board. However, boards acting as strategy makers are involved in these
stages of decision making as well as the top management team, with each stage being
subject to varying levels of board involvement. So although the literature reports
research which has explored board involvement in setting the strategic direction of
organizations, Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella (2009: 262) recently pointed out that
33

there is still “much that we do not know about board involvement [in strategic decision
making].”

Proposition 4: When board members are more capable of participating
directly in forming organizational strategy by virtue of their human
capital, social capital or Board Capital, some boards do act as strategy
makers for their organizations.
Proposition 5: When board members act as strategy makers, boards
participate in the stages of strategic decision making including identifying
the problem, clarifying the issues, generating and evaluating alternatives,
and making a choice.
Boards as Strategy Makers and Organizational Performance
The resource dependence view focuses attention on the premise that access to
resources is crucial to any organization (Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
Organizations that tap into their boards as resources are developing competitive
advantages which organizations that do not utilize their board resources to the same
extent are lacking (Leana & Van Buren, 1999; Stiles, 2001). Boards are particularly
important resources to organizations in their process of forming and choosing
organizational strategies (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Geletkanycz, Boyd, &
Finkelstein, 2001; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; Lorsch &
MacIver, 1989), a process that is a fundamental component of an organization’s ability to
compete and prosper. The human capital and social capital board members bring to the
boardroom increase the capacity of the organization to make effective strategic decisions
(Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Certo, 2003; Gales & Kesner,
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1994; Kor & Sundarmurthy, 2009; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Pfeffer, 1991; Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978; Westphal, 1999).
Human capital in the form of experience with board-level authority,
accountability, and strategic decisions which board members bring to the organization’s
strategic decision making process means that board members are better prepared to make
strategic decisions for the organization. Human capital in the form of work and
educational experience means that multiple perspectives are brought to bear on the issues
facing the organization rather than only the CEO’s or his or her management team’s
perspective. Human capital is a portion of a crucial foundation to enable organizational
strategic decision making processes that will result in more effective strategic decisions.
Social capital in the form of the networks board members have cultivated with
others expands their knowledge of strategic options available to the organization. These
networks also expand board members’ knowledge of opportunities and threats that exist
in the organization’s environment, improving their abilities to engage in sensemaking
effectively. Board members who enjoy collaborative relationships with their CEOs have
developed a necessary level of trust in the good intentions and capabilities of their CEOs
as well as other board members, opening channels for communicating the information
board members have gathered from their network sources. These communication
channels open opportunities for board members to provide advice to their CEOs and for
CEOs to seek their counsel. Social capital is therefore another aspect of a crucial
foundation to enable organizational strategic decision making processes that will result in
more effective strategic decisions.
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When both human capital and social capital are present in combination, the
resulting Board Capital represents the most solid base and promising opportunity for
boards to participate effectively in organizational decision making processes.
Beyond the opportunity to improve the quality of the strategic decisions that result
from the decision making process, another benefit arises when board resources are fully
utilized. Board members are better informed of the details of the organizational context
and of the strategies themselves when boards are involved in forming the organizational
strategies. This familiarity will increase the board’s confidence in the judiciousness of
the strategies that survive the evaluation process. Boards will therefore be more likely to
approve implementation of these strategies when they are confident these are wise
courses of action for the organization to take.
Strategic decisions which are effective for the organization will lead to positive
outcomes. Positive results that can be traced to the implemented strategies are among the
important outcomes organizational decision makers look for as indicators that the chosen
strategies were effective. Although there are many factors that may interpose themselves
between any one implemented strategy and overall organizational performance outcomes,
it is reasonable to expect an overall pattern of implementing better decisions will be more
effective for the organization, thus improving overall organizational performance as well.
Of the studies in the literature discussed earlier which have explored board
involvement in forming strategy, only a few addressed the connection between this
involvement and organizational performance. Pearce and Zahra (1991) found that firms
with boards that played a significant role in making corporate strategic decisions were
associated with higher firm earnings per share and improved stock performance. Hill and
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Snell (1988) found that outsider representation on the board was associated with better
financial performance in their sample of Fortune 500 firms, and Kor and Sundarmurthy
(2009) found that the human and social capital attributes of outsiders were significantly
related to sales growth in their sample of technology-based entrepreneurial firms.
Iecovich (2004) found that the more boards were involved in making changes in
organizational programs and services, the more sound was the organizational fiscal
status. Lastly, Judge and Zeithaml (1992) found a positive but weak relationship between
board involvement in strategic decision making and organizational financial performance.
So the literature reveals some evidence that involving boards in forming organizational
strategy is related to improved organizational performance, but more work is needed to
expand this empirical evidence.

Proposition 6: When board members act as strategy makers, the strategic
decisions which they participate in forming will be implemented by the
organization.
Proposition 7: When board members act as strategy makers by
participating in forming organizational strategy, there will be positive
outcomes from implementing the strategic decisions.

This chapter reviewed selected literature which has explored the involvement of
boards in organizational strategic decision making, the outcomes of this involvement, and
the elements of human capital and social capital that may lead to greater involvement of
boards in organizational strategic decision making. With this previous research as a
foundation, the next chapter will describe the hypotheses of interest, sample and
methodology for this study.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
This study explores the antecedents and consequences of the involvement of
boards in the process of forming strategy for their organizations in order to expand our
understanding of boards as strategy makers rather than thinking of them only in their
traditional roles as monitors or advisors. This chapter describes the research questions,
the hypotheses, the research design, the research variables, the participants, the research
instruments, the data collection procedures, and the data analysis method for the study.
Research Questions
There are two primary research questions in this study. First, if boards of
directors are potentially crucial resources to organizations as the resource dependence
view suggests, what factors lead to boards being directly involved in forming the
strategies of their organizations rather than being relegated to the periphery of the
strategic decision making process? And secondly, are there benefits to organizations
when their boards are involved in forming strategy rather than only monitoring or
advising the top management team members as they make the organizational strategic
decisions? Chapter 2 offered propositions relating to these two broad research questions,
and the hypotheses discussed in the next section describe how the questions will be
addressed in this study in detail.
Research Hypotheses
For boards to be effective strategy makers, boards must be capable of recognizing
issues, developing alternative strategic options, evaluating those alternatives and making
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strategic choices. As discussed in chapter 2, the levels of human capital, social capital,
and Board Capital (i.e., the combination of human capital and social capital) that boards
possess impact their capabilities to be effectively involved in strategic decision making.
Two forms of human capital—the knowledge and skills developed from board
experiences and those developed from work and educational experiences—are
particularly important. Also, two forms of social capital—the networks of relationships
among board members and the collaborative relationship between boards and their
CEOs—are of particular interest. If boards are more capable of being involved in
forming strategy by virtue of their human capital, social capital, or Board Capital, they
are in a position to participate directly in the strategic decision making process. And,
because of these superior capabilities incorporated into the process of forming strategy,
we might expect positive outcomes for the organization from involving boards in the
decision making process. These proposed relationships among the variables of interest
are shown in Figure 3 and discussed in detail in the remainder of this section.
Human Capital
The experiences of board members with decision making at the board level added
to their work and educational experiences create human capital. Human capital in the
form of extensive experience in making decisions at the board level increases the board
members’ capabilities to make strategic decisions in other contexts. This board-level
experience may come from the board members serving on other boards currently or from
past board service. Board members having human capital in the form of business work
experiences and extensive educational experiences also leads to greater capabilities for
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making strategic decisions. Similarly, board members with experience with a variety of
strategies either as a result of their experiences in their home firms or from serving on
other boards bring more knowledge to the strategic decision making process. The
perspectives developed as a result of these work and educational experiences allow board
members to make valuable contributions to the process of raising issues, developing
alternatives, evaluating alternatives, and making strategic choices.
Board members with greater human capital will be more capable of forming
strategy, and these capabilities will mean that boards are more valuable as resources to
their organizations for forming organizational strategy. Organizations that see their
boards as valuable resources will be more likely to tap into these resources by involving
them in forming organizational strategy. When boards are involved in forming strategy,
they participate in one or more of the stages of strategic decision making including
identifying the problem, clarifying the issues, generating and evaluating alternatives, and
making a choice. When boards are not involved in forming strategy but rather are acting
only as monitors or advisors, they remain at the periphery of the decision making process
and do not participate in these stages of decision making (see Figure 4). Since board
members with more human capital will be more capable of being involved in strategic
decision making, they will be more likely to characterize their boards as highly focused
on organizational strategic decision making relative to other roles.

Hypothesis 1: Board members with greater human capital (i.e., boardlevel experience, business work experience, educational experience , and
experience with different business strategies) are more likely to participate
in strategic decision making by raising or clarifying issues, generating or
evaluating alternatives, or choosing strategies.
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Hypothesis 2: Board members with greater human capital (i.e., boardlevel experience, business work experience, educational experience, and
experience with different business strategies) are more likely to
characterize their boards as highly focused on organizational strategic
decision making.

Social Capital
Social capital arises from relationships with others. Board members who have
extensive networks with other individuals with board experience have the opportunity to
draw upon the board-level experiences of others as well as their own. These connections
may be based on current associations with other board members or from associations on
boards in the past when those connections are maintained beyond the term on the board.
The relationships are opportunities for board members to develop trust, expectations, and
identification with other individuals with board-level experience and to develop shared
interpretations and language about organizational contexts and strategic issues. This
exponentially greater exposure to issues and strategic choices improves the members’
capabilities to be involved in forming strategy.
In addition to the social capital accruing from networks with other board
members, the relationship between boards and their CEOs is another source of social
capital. Boards which have developed collaborative relationships with their CEOs are in
more frequent contact with their CEOs both in terms of board meetings and contacts
outside of board meetings. Trust in the competence and reliability of all parties is
important in developing collaborative relationships of this kind, and collaborative
relationships are characteristically ones in which board members offer their advice and
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counsel and CEOs seek that advice and counsel as well. The existence of collaborative
relationships with their CEOs added to their relationships with other board members
results in board members being more capable of being effectively involved in forming
strategy.
Similar to human capital, boards comprised of members with greater social capital
will be more capable of forming strategy, and these capabilities will mean that boards are
more valuable as resources to their organizations for forming organizational strategy.
And organizations that see their boards as valuable resources will be more likely to tap
into these resources by involving them in forming organizational strategy. Again, boards
which are forming strategy will participate in one or more of the strategic decision
making stages rather than only evaluating the strategic decisions of the top management
team and will focus on this strategic decision making role.
Hypothesis 3: Boards characterized by greater social capital (i.e.,
networks with other board members and collaborative relationships with
their CEOs) are more likely to participate in strategic decision making by
raising or clarifying issues, generating or evaluating alternatives, or
choosing strategies.
Hypothesis 4: Board members with greater social capital (i.e., networks
with other board members and collaborative relationships with their
CEOs) are more likely to characterize their boards as highly focused on
organizational strategic decision making.

Board Capital
Human capital (i.e., board-level experiences and work/educational experiences)
and social capital (i.e., board member networks and collaborative board/CEO
relationships) individually increase the capabilities of boards to be involved in forming
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strategy. Boards with greater human capital and social capital in concert, or in other
words with greater Board Capital, will be the most capable of forming strategy and will
therefore be the most likely to be involved in forming strategy as organizations tap into
their boards as resources.

Hypothesis 5: Boards characterized by greater Board Capital (i.e., greater
human capital plus greater social capital in concert) are more likely to
participate in strategic decision making by raising or clarifying issues,
generating or evaluating alternatives, or choosing strategies than boards
with human capital or social capital alone.
Hypothesis 6: Board members with greater Board Capital (i.e., greater
human capital plus greater social capital in concert) are more likely to
characterize their boards as highly focused on organizational strategic
decision making than boards with human capital or social capital alone.

Performance Outcomes
Boards as monitors are evaluating the decisions about organizational strategy
made by the top management team. As a result, board members may have limited
understanding of the issues or the organizational context that created the need for the
strategic decisions. Boards as advisors also remain at the periphery of the decision
making process and therefore similarly may not thoroughly understand the issues and
context. However, boards as strategy makers are involved directly in the strategic
decision making process by raising issues, developing alternative options for
consideration, evaluating the alternatives, or making choices. This direct involvement in
the strategic decision making process means that boards have a more thorough
understanding of all aspects of the decision situation, and this familiarity will lead to a
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greater propensity for boards to implement the strategic decisions they have been
involved in making.
Board members bring a variety of backgrounds, experiences and perspectives to
the decision making process, and one theoretical perspective suggests this diversity of
perspectives will lead to better strategic decisions. Positive outcomes of the implemented
strategic decisions, including positive financial outcomes, are indicators of the
effectiveness of the decisions.
Hypothesis 7: When boards participate in one or more of the stages of
strategic decision making by raising issues, clarifying issues, generating or
evaluating alternatives, or choosing strategies, the resulting strategic
decisions are more likely to be implemented.
Hypothesis 8: When boards participate in one or more of the stages of
strategic decision making by raising issues, clarifying issues, generating or
evaluating alternatives, or choosing strategies, the implemented strategic
decisions are more likely to result in positive financial outcomes.
Research Design
In order to gather data on the involvement of boards in forming strategy to
address these hypotheses, this study employs a cross-sectional survey research design
using the general medical and surgical hospital industry in the United States as the
organizational context. Hospitals face a dynamic environment in which hospital
strategies must address changes in health care financing, complexity in health care
delivery, changes in physician-hospital relationships, rapid technological advances,
intense competitive pressures, and concerns about access, quality, and cost (Alexander,
Weiner, & Griffith, 2006; Fennell & Alexander, 1993). Therefore the hospital context is
well suited for exploring the process of forming organizational strategy in the face of
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rapid changes in the organizational competitive environment. The survey method is also
well suited for this study because it facilitates asking individuals who are currently
involved in the strategic decision making process in hospitals questions that are designed
specifically to address the study hypotheses rather than relying on secondary data and
surrogate measures.
The following sections further describe elements of the research design for this
study, including the research variables, participants, research instruments, data collection
procedures, and data analysis method.
Research Variables
Addressing the study hypotheses will involve several independent and dependent
variables connected by the mediating variable of board involvement in forming strategy.
This section presents the specific operationalizations of these variables.
Independent Variables
The independent variables of the study are human capital, social capital and
Board Capital.
Human capital in this study is comprised of the knowledge and skills developed
from the board experiences and work experiences of board members. Board experiences
are measured as the combined total number of years that board members have served on
boards other than the focal board, and these board experiences may be from serving on
other boards currently or in the past. Work/educational experiences are measured as
experiences in business-related functional areas such as finance, planning, and
management, experiences in educational programs such as undergraduate, master, and
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doctoral degree programs, and experiences with different business strategies identified in
the Miles and Snow (1978) typology that board members have accrued through their
work at their home firms or board service. The Miles and Snow (1978) "defender"
strategy is characterized by offering a relatively stable set of products and services and
focusing on the existing market domain. The "analyzer" strategy is characterized by
monitoring the actions of other organizations that are first movers when evaluating
promising new products or services and following their lead with products or services
that compete with the earlier entries in some competitive facet such as cost efficiencies.
The "prospector" strategy is characterized by being a first mover and responding rapidly
to market opportunities. And the "reactor" strategy is characterized by a lack of a
consistent pattern in the strategic approach.
Social capital in this study is comprised of relationships developed through
networks with other individuals who have board experience and through collaboration
with the CEO of the focal organization. Board networks are measured in terms of the
three dimensions (structural, relational, and cognitive) identified by Nahapiet and
Ghoshal (1998). The structural dimension, the overall pattern of connections among
board members, is measured as the total number of other boards on which the board
members currently serve or have served in the past. The relational dimension, which
involves the development of trust, expectations, and identification with others, is
measured as the number of friendship ties among board members on the focal board.
And the cognitive dimension, the shared interpretations, language and systems of
meaning which result from high levels of interaction within the group, is measured as the
number of years board members have served on the focal board. Collaborative
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relationships between boards and their CEOs are measured as the frequency of contacts
both during and outside of board meetings, the frequency of board member-initiated
advice giving and CEO-initiated advice seeking, and the number of friendship ties
between board members and their CEOs.
Board Capital is a summative construct comprised of the elements of human
capital and social capital in combination.
Mediator Variable
The mediator variable is board involvement in forming strategy. Board
involvement is operationalized as respondents indicating that they participated in one or
more of the stages of strategic decision making (i.e., raising issues, clarifying issues,
developing alternative options, evaluating the alternatives, or making choices) when
making a respondent-specified strategic decision.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables represent the performance outcomes of the involvement
of boards in forming strategy in terms of the implementation of strategies that the board
has been involved in forming and the financial outcomes of the implemented strategies.
The implementation of strategies is measured as the percentage of strategies that the
board was involved in forming that is reported by the CEO to have been implemented by
the organization. The financial outcomes of the implemented strategies are measured as
the financial outcomes on an eleven-point scale ranging from negative to positive as
reported independently by the board members and the CEO.
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Control Variables
Since system affiliation, hospital ownership (governmental, non-governmental
not-for-profit, or investor-owned), and hospital size may possibly affect the degree of
involvement of boards in forming strategy, these characteristics of hospitals are control
variables in this study.
Targeted Participants
Individuals who currently serve on the boards of general medical and surgical
hospitals in the United States comprise the target population of interest in this study. In
order to include hospitals with similar environmental and regulatory contexts, the sample
consists of the board members and chief executive officers of general medical and
surgical hospitals that are located in a single state in the southeastern region of the United
States. The sampling frame, the American Hospital Association Guide to the Health
Care Field, provides a roster of general medical and surgical hospitals by state and
includes the contact information for the CEOs of these hospitals. Since there is no
centralized roster of board members for all hospitals in the state, the CEOs are the initial
points of contact for accessing their board members in order to solicit their participation.
Research Instruments
To gather data as directly as possible from individuals actually making strategic
decisions in hospitals, two original survey instruments developed specifically for this
study ask participants to provide information about the strategic decision making process
in their hospitals. One survey instrument is tailored to the members of the hospital
boards, and the other survey instrument is tailored to the hospital CEOs.
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The survey items address the respondents’ current and past membership on
hospital and non-hospital boards; the nature of their work and educational backgrounds;
their demographic characteristics; and the experience they have had with strategic options
categorized according to the typology developed by Miles and Snow (1978). The survey
items also address the nature of the hospital board focus; the dynamics of the interactions
among board members and between board members and their CEOs; the extent of board
involvement in the stages of decision making (i.e., raising the issues, clarifying the issues,
generating alternatives, evaluating alternatives, choosing alternatives); the extent of board
involvement at the periphery of the strategic decision making process (i.e.,
reviewing/questioning the CEO’s recommendations or accepting/ rejecting the CEO’s
recommendations); and the outcomes of strategic decisions in terms of implementation
and financial outcomes. Table 1 shows the research variables and their related survey
items.
A panel of current hospital board members reviewed the original survey
instruments for clarity of wording, length of time to complete the surveys, etc. as a pilot
test for the study. The panel's resounding recommendation was to substantially shorten
the surveys so they would take ten minutes or less to complete. Given that the study
participants will be busy executives who are frequently asked to respond to surveys, the
panel's concern was that hospital board members and CEOs would not complete the
surveys if it took much of their time to do so. After eliminating redundancies and
questions that were not crucial to this study, the current survey instruments are
approximately half the length of the original instruments. Questions were also phrased
whenever possible so they could be answered by checking a box. Additional test
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administrations of the surveys indicated that the current surveys take seven to eleven
minutes to complete.
Data Collection Procedures
I worked with the state Hospital Association for eighteen months in an effort to
gain its support for this study before contacting hospitals in the state. After receiving
approval from the University of Tennessee Institutional Review Board, I called the
administrative assistants of all CEOs in the general medical and surgical hospitals in the
state. In this initial personal contact, I introduced myself and described my study to the
administrative assistants and asked for an e-mail address so I could send the study
description and survey instruments to the CEOs. With this personal approach, I
attempted to gain the administrative assistant's support so that he or she would advocate
for me with the CEO. I e-mailed the description of my study and the online survey links
immediately after completing each phone call.
I asked the CEOs to participate in the study by completing the Hospital CEO
Survey and asking the members of their board to complete the Hospital Board Member
Survey, stressing that the surveys take approximately ten minutes to complete and that I
will provide study summary reports to participants if they wish to receive them. I
provided links in my e-mails to CEOs to enable participants to complete the surveys
online, and I also offered to send paper copies of the survey instruments and postage-paid
return envelopes if the CEOs preferred. By providing the option of paper copies for
completing the surveys, individuals who may not have experience with online survey
instruments or convenient access to the internet had equal opportunity to participate in
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the study. The option of paper copies may also fit the standard method of communicating
with board members for some CEOs.
Research involving top executives is plagued by low response rates, response
rates that are often less than 25% (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001), so a plan for following
up on the initial request for participation in this study was essential. One month after the
initial e-mail, I contacted non-responding CEOs via e-mail again to encourage their own
and their board members' participation. I provided links to the online surveys again and
stressed that the surveys should take a short time to complete. When it was apparent that
I could not expect further participation, I concluded the data collection phase at the end of
2011.
Data Analysis Method
Structural equation modeling (SEM) is a statistical methodology well-suited to
this study. SEM facilitates a confirmatory approach (i.e., hypothesis testing) for models
representing causal processes involving multiple predictor variables each measured by
multiple indicators. Unlike regression methods that are based on observed
measurements only, SEM can be used to incorporate both latent (i.e., unobserved) and
manifest (i.e., observed) variables. SEM also enables assessing models incorporating
mediating variables and multiple dependent variables. Using SEM, the hypothesized
model can be tested for its fit to the sample data in a simultaneous analysis of the entire
system of variables (Blaikie, 2003; Bollen, 1989; Byrne, 2001).
This chapter presented the research questions, study hypotheses, and details
regarding the research design for the study. The next chapter will provide the findings
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from the analyses of the board member and CEO responses that resulted from the
administration of the survey instruments.
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CHAPTER 4
STUDY FINDINGS

This study focuses on the involvement of board members in the process of
forming strategy for their organizations and the outcomes of that involvement. This
chapter describes the results of the analyses of data gathered via surveys from board
members who are currently participating in the strategic decision making process of
general medical and surgical hospitals in a state in the southeastern region of the United
States. Chief executive officers of hospitals in the same state also provided their
perspectives on the involvement of their board members in making strategic decisions
and the results of that involvement, and this chapter presents the results of this second
survey of these executives as well.
Study Participants
Thirty participants identified their role as board members and completed the
Hospital Board Member Survey designed to gather data for this study. Fourteen
participants identified themselves as the chief executive officers (CEOs) of their hospitals
and completed the Hospital CEO Survey tailored to the executives. The participants
could choose to respond to the survey either on-line utilizing the SPSS mrInterview
software or on paper. All participants chose to respond on-line. After extensive pilot
testing and revising for clarity and efficiency, the survey instruments could be completed
in approximately ten minutes.
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The participating board members and CEOs represent twenty-two (22) hospitals
from across the state, or nineteen percent (19%) of the general medical and surgical
hospitals in the state. These twenty-two hospitals include hospitals that are small (less
than 100 beds), medium (100-299 beds), and large (300 or more beds) in size. These
hospitals also include governmental, non-governmental not-for-profit, and investorowned hospitals in terms of ownership. In addition, these twenty-two hospitals in the
sample include hospitals that are part of systems and those that are not. Chi square tests
revealed no significant differences between the twenty-two hospitals in the sample and all
hospitals in the state in terms of size, ownership, and system membership.
The participating board members represent fifteen (15) hospitals from across the
state. Chi square tests revealed no significant differences between the fifteen hospitals in
the sample and all hospitals in the state in terms of size, ownership, or system
membership. The fourteen hospitals that participating CEOs represent were across the
spectrum in terms of size, ownership, and system membership as well, and chi square
tests again revealed no significant differences between the hospitals in the sample and all
hospitals in the state. This is an indication that the contexts within which the participants
in the sample are making decisions are representative of the hospitals in the state.
Surveys of executives are plagued by low response rates, response rates that are
often less than twenty-five percent (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). The fifteen hospitals
in the board member sample represent thirteen percent (13%) of all hospitals in the state,
and the fourteen hospitals in the CEO sample represent twelve percent (12%). As a
comparison to these surveys for an individual’s dissertation study, a 2005 survey of
hospital Chairs of the Board and CEOs in the United States conducted by the Health
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Research and Educational Trust (HRET) in conjunction with and funded by the American
Hospital Association (AHA) resulted in nineteen percent (19%) of the hospitals in the
United States being represented in the Board Chair sample and thirty-three percent (33%)
of the hospitals in the United States being represented in the CEO sample. Table 2
summarizes the hospital contexts represented in the sample.
Although most of the hospital CEOs are voting members of their boards, it could
be argued that including the CEOs as board members may skew the results in favor of
board participation in the strategic decision making process and in the earlier stages of
decision making. I therefore took the more conservative approach and used the responses
from the thirty non-CEO board members for the analyses.
Of the participants who identified their primary role as board members,
approximately 17% serve small hospitals, 60% medium-sized hospitals, and 23% serve
large hospitals. Twenty-three percent (23%) of the board members serve governmental
hospitals, 27% serve non-governmental not-for-profit hospitals, and 50% serve investorowned hospitals. Seventy-three percent (73%) said their hospitals are members of
systems.
Men comprise 87% of the board member respondents, and 93% of these
respondents are white. The ages of the respondents ranged from 35 to 77 years with 13%
in their seventies, 27% in their sixties, 30% in their fifties, 23% in their forties and 7% in
their thirties. Board members holding an associate degree represent 3% of the sample,
undergraduate degrees 47%, and graduate degrees 50%. Their functional work
backgrounds include medicine, finance, accounting, marketing/sales, planning, law,
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information systems, and general management. Table 3 summarizes the demographic
characteristics of the board member respondents.
Tenure on the focal hospital board ranged from one year to twenty-two (22) years,
with 53% of the participants serving for five years or less. Table 4 describes the tenure
on the focal hospital board in more detail. Sixty percent (60%) of the board members
indicated they are currently serving on other boards of directors in addition to the focal
hospital’s board, and 60% said they had served on other boards in the past.
Board Member Participation in Decision Making
The Hospital Board Member survey asked the participants to choose a strategic
decision that they had participated in making while on the hospital board. The board
members indicated they had participated in strategic decisions such as deciding to
construct a new hospital facility, purchase another hospital in the same city, and open a
new cancer treatment center or cardiovascular treatment center.
There are stages in the strategic decision making process including identifying the
problem, clarifying the issues, generating and evaluating alternatives, and making a
choice (Russo & Schoemaker, 2002). In their role as strategy makers, 13% of board
members indicated they had participated in raising issues initially, 50% participated in
clarifying the issues, 10% participated in generating alternatives, 60% participated in
evaluating alternatives, and 30% participated in choosing alternatives.
In addition to their role as strategy makers, in their roles as monitors or advisors
board members review and question the CEO’s recommendations and accept or reject
these recommendations. Seventy-seven percent (77%) of the board members indicated
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they had participated in reviewing and questioning the CEO’s recommendations and 70%
indicated they had participated in accepting or rejecting the CEO’s recommendations
regarding the strategic decision they were considering. Table 5 summarizes this
participation in the decision stages and post-decision stages.
All thirty respondents indicated the decisions they considered in answering this
question were ultimately implemented. Ten percent (10%) reported that the decision had
negative financial outcomes, 37% reported that the decision had neutral financial
outcomes, and 53% reported positive financial outcomes. Table 6 shows the percentages
at each point on an eleven-point scale from negative 5 indicating the extreme negative
end of the scale to positive 5 indicating the extreme positive end of the scale.
Board Focus
Many would agree that hospital boards fulfill three primary roles as depicted in
Figure 5: establishing the hospital’s mission and strategic direction, building and
maintaining external relationships, and overseeing the hospital’s management team and
performance (Lee, Alexander, Wang, Margolin, & Combes, 2008). In terms of
establishing the mission and strategic direction, thirteen percent (13%) of the board
members indicated a low focus on this role, 37% indicated a medium focus, and 50%
indicated a high focus on this role. For the role of building external relationships, ten
percent (10%) reported a low focus on this role, 50% reported a medium focus, and 40%
reported a high focus. And lastly, seventeen percent (17%) reported a low focus on the
role of overseeing performance, 37% reported a medium focus, and 47% reported a high
focus on this role.
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Familiarity with Strategic Approaches
The board participants were asked to indicate which of the following
organizations most resembled their hospital’s strategic approach:

Organization A maintains a “niche” within its industry by offering a relative
stable set of products/services. Generally Organization A is not at the forefront of
new products/services and concentrates instead on doing the best job possible in
its existing arena.
Organization B maintains a relatively stable base of products/services while at
the same time moving to meet selected, promising new product/service
developments. Organization B monitors the actions of other organizations that
are “first movers” and attempts to follow with a more cost-efficient or wellconceived product/service.
Organization C makes relatively frequent changes in its set of products/services.
Organization C tries to be the “first mover” with new products/services and
responds rapidly to early signals of market needs and opportunities.
Organization D cannot be clearly characterized in terms of its approach to
changing its products/services. It does not have a consistent pattern.

Seven percent (7%) of the board members indicated Organization A most
resembled their hospital, and 77% indicated Organization B, 13% indicated Organization
C and 3% indicated Organization D most resembled their hospital.
When asked which of the above organizations most resembled the board
members’ home organizations (that is, the organizations where they are currently
employed or, if retired, were formerly employed), 17% selected Organization A, 60%
selected Organization B, 20% selected Organization C, and 3% selected Organization D.
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Relationships with the CEO and Other Board Members
Selecting from a scale of strongly disagree (SD), disagree (D), neither agree nor
disagree (N), agree (A) or strongly agree (SA), board members indicated the accuracy of
several statements regarding their relationships with their CEOs and other members of
their board. Of particular interest, seventy-seven percent (77%) of the board members
reported agreement or strong agreement that board members participate extensively
during board meetings by voicing their viewpoints and concerns, eighty percent (80%)
agreed or strongly agreed that board members frequently offer advice to the CEO about
important decisions, and seventy-four percent (74%) agreed or strongly agreed that they
considered the CEO to be a personal friend. Table 7 shows the percentage of board
members responding at each level of the scale for each statement.
The Structural Equation Model
Structural equation modeling (SEM) is an appropriate method to use in this study
because of its ability to handle latent (i.e., unobserved) and manifest (i.e., observed)
variables, multiple predictor variables each measured by multiple indicators, multiple
dependent variables, and mediating variables. The model in this study incorporates both
formative latent variables and reflective latent variables; that is, formative latent variables
are defined by the combination of their indicators whereas the state of the reflective latent
variables is mirrored by each of their individual indicators.
An example that illustrates a formative latent variable is socioeconomic status
(SES). Socioeconomic status is defined by the combination of an individual’s education,
income, occupation, and residence (Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001; Edwards &
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Bagozzi, 2000). Individuals who have high socioeconomic status are wealthier or more
highly educated, but they do not become wealthy or educated because of high
socioeconomic status (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). If the level of education increases
for example, SES increases by definition, but an increase in SES does not necessarily
indicate an increase in education. Also, formative indicators may not exhibit any
particular pattern of correlations or no correlation at all. If the level of education
increases, the individual’s income, occupation or residence may or may not change as
well. Formative indicators are not interchangeable, and each indicator is an essential
ingredient in the definition of the latent construct. Therefore, omitting an indicator
changes the nature of the construct (Bollen & Lennox, 1991).
In this study, the latent variables human capital and social capital are defined by
the formative indicators shown in Table 8. Table 8 also shows the path weights for each
indicator as it predicts its associated latent variable. Note that the sign of the estimate is
not important; rather it is the absolute value of the path weights of the indicator variables
that describes the prediction.
On the other hand, an example of a latent variable with reflective indicators is
self-esteem. We would expect individuals with high self-esteem to reflect that selfesteem by agreeing with statements such as “I feel that I am as good as the next person.”
Responding to a question on the survey does not create the self-esteem but rather is a
reflection of the underlying latent variable (Bollen, 1989).
In this study, the latent variables related to board member involvement in strategic
decision making and board focus are reflected in the indicators shown in Table 9. Once
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again note that it is the absolute value of the path weights of the indicator variables that
describes the prediction level.
The outcome variables related to the implementation of strategic decisions and the
financial outcomes of these decisions are manifest (i.e., observed) variables. That is, the
respondents provided these data in their responses to items on the surveys.
Given the original sample size of 30 board members, the bootstrapping procedure
available for the SEM analysis is appropriate because the bootstrapped sampling
distribution is free from assumptions of multivariate normality. Bootstrapping, a term
derived from the expression “to pull oneself up by the bootstraps,” is a procedure in
which multiple samples (in this case 200 samples) of the same size as the original sample
(in this case samples of size 30) are randomly drawn with replacement from the original
sample (Byrne, 2001). Thus, for example, board member #27 may be in one of the
bootstrapped samples twice and not in another sample at all. However, each of the 200
bootstrapped samples contains only the original data; the procedure does not impute or
modify the responses of the board members in the original sample.
I am particularly interested in the details of an individual board member’s
participation in making a particular strategic decision and the outcomes of this specific
decision. This necessitates utilizing the board members’ responses for their involvement
in the process and for the outcomes of the specific decision they considered in answering
the questions on the survey instrument because independent data on outcomes are not
available at the level of the individual strategic decisions. In order to assess whether
common methods bias is problematic in the data, I ran Harman’s one-factor test in which
all variables are entered into a factor analysis to determine if a single factor accounts for
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the majority of the covariance in independent and dependent variables (Podsakoff &
Organ, 1986). In this case, however, at most twenty percent (20%) of the variance could
be the result of common method variance, well less than fifty percent (50%). It should be
noted also that some portion of this twenty percent (20%) of the variance could in fact be
due to relationships other than common method variance. Therefore, the Harmon’s onefactor test indicates that common methods bias is not of substantial concern in these
responses.
Estimation of the model produced a chi square ratio of 3.341 for the default
model. Since the chi square ratio is influenced by sample size, various researchers have
suggested that a ratio in the range of 2 – 5 indicates an adequate fit to the data (Marsh &
Hocevar, 1985). Other measures of fit indicated poor fit of the overall model to the data
(χ²=698.3, d.f. = 209, p = .000; root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA] =
.284; comparative fit index [CFI] = .000). However, as Byrne (2001: 87) notes, “global
fit indexes alone cannot possibly envelop all that needs to be known about a model in
order to judge the adequacy of its fit to the sample data.” Bollen (1989: 68) recommends
checking the fit with the data “by comparing the magnitude, sign, and statistical
significance of parameter estimates to those hypothesized in the model. In short, the
model implies that the data should have certain characteristics that we can check.” The
next section presents the results of the model estimation regarding these expected
relationships in each of the study hypotheses.
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Findings for the Research Hypotheses
This study proposes several hypotheses regarding the antecedents and
consequences of board member involvement in strategic decision making. Before
presenting the findings related to the hypotheses themselves, I will address the control
variables. The control variables for this study are ownership, system affiliation, and
hospital size in the belief that these various contexts for decision making may potentially
impact the degree to which board members will be involved in the hospital strategic
decision making process. The status of the hospital in terms of these control variables is
reported in the American Hospital Association Guide to the Health Care Field.
The ownership type is either governmental, non-governmental not-for-profit, or
investor-owned. When ownership type was incorporated in the model, the estimated path
weight was not significant (-.002, p < .9) indicating that the hospital being a
governmental entity or a not-for-profit or investor-owned hospital is not influencing the
level of involvement of board members in the sample. System affiliation indicates
whether a hospital is part of a larger system of hospitals or independent. When system
affiliation was included in the model, the estimated weight was not significant (-.003,
p<.7). The hospital size in this study is measured as the number of staffed beds, the
typical measurement of size used in the hospital industry. When size was incorporated in
the model, the estimated path weight once again was not significant (-.006, p< .4).
These hospital contexts reflecting ownership, system affiliation, and size did not have an
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impact on the involvement of board members in strategic decision making in this study.
Table 10 shows the path weights for the control variables.
With that background, I will discuss the findings regarding the study hypotheses
next. The first two hypotheses, depicted graphically in figures 6 and 7, relate to the
influence of the human capital board members bring to the boardroom.
Hypothesis 1: Board members with greater human capital (i.e., boardlevel experience, business work experience, educational experience , and
experience with different business strategies) are more likely to participate
in strategic decision making by raising or clarifying issues, generating or
evaluating alternatives, or choosing strategies.
The analysis of the data relating to human capital and board member involvement
in the stages of strategic decision making resulted in a highly significant estimate (.804,
p<.001), providing strong support for Hypothesis 1.

Hypothesis 2: Board members with greater human capital (i.e., boardlevel experience, business work experience, educational experience, and
experience with different business strategies) are more likely to
characterize their boards as highly focused on organizational strategic
decision making.

The analysis of the data regarding the influence of human capital on board focus
resulted in a path weight that was not significant (-.063, p<.60). Hypothesis 2 was not
supported.
The next two hypotheses, depicted in figures 8 and 9, relate to the influence of the
social capital board members bring to the boardroom.
Hypothesis 3: Boards characterized by greater social capital (i.e.,
networks with other board members and collaborative relationships with
their CEOs) are more likely to participate in strategic decision making by
raising or clarifying issues, generating or evaluating alternatives, or
choosing strategies.
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The analysis of the data relating to social capital and board member involvement
in the stages of strategic decision making resulted in a highly significant estimate (.593,
p<.001), providing strong support for Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 4: Board members with greater social capital (i.e., networks
with other board members and collaborative relationships with their
CEOs) are more likely to characterize their boards as highly focused on
organizational strategic decision making.
The analysis of the data regarding the influence of social capital on board focus
resulted in an estimate (-.305, p<.05) that was negative (i.e., not in the expected
direction). Hypothesis 4 was not supported.
The next two hypotheses, depicted in figures 10 and 11, relate to the influence of
the Board Capital (i.e., the sum of human capital and social capital) that board members
bring to the boardroom.

Hypothesis 5: Boards characterized by greater Board Capital (i.e., greater
human capital plus greater social capital in concert) are more likely to
participate in strategic decision making by raising or clarifying issues,
generating or evaluating alternatives, or choosing strategies than boards
with human capital or social capital alone.
The analysis of the data relating to Board Capital and board member involvement
in the stages of strategic decision making resulted in a highly significant estimate (1.397,
p<.001), providing strong support for Hypothesis 5. When I ran the model with human
capital alone (i.e., social capital was not included in the model), the path estimate
between human capital and board member involvement in strategic decision making was
.999 (p<.001). When I ran the model with social capital alone (i.e., human capital was
not included in the model), the path estimate between social capital and board member
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involvement in strategic decision making was .913 (p<.001). Therefore this analysis
supports the hypothesis that board members with Board Capital are more likely to
participate in strategic decision making than board members with either human capital or
social capital alone.

Hypothesis 6: Board members with greater Board Capital (i.e., greater
human capital plus greater social capital in concert) are more likely to
characterize their boards as highly focused on organizational strategic
decision making than boards with human capital or social capital alone.

The analysis of the data regarding the influence of Board Capital on board focus
resulted in an estimate (-.368, p<.001) that was negative (i.e., not in the expected
direction). Hypothesis 6 was not supported.
The last two hypotheses, depicted in figures 12 and 13, relate to the outcomes of
board member involvement in forming strategy.
Hypothesis 7: When boards participate in one or more of the stages of
strategic decision making by raising issues, clarifying issues, generating or
evaluating alternatives, or choosing strategies, the resulting strategic
decisions are more likely to be implemented.
All thirty respondents indicated the decisions they considered in answering the
questions on the survey were ultimately implemented.
In order to assess this hypothesis from an independent perspective, I also asked
the CEOs on the Hospital CEO Survey to tell me the percentage of decisions typically
implemented if their boards were involved at each decision stage. Fifty-seven (57%) of
the CEOs responded that the decisions were typically implemented if their boards were
involved in raising issues, 86% said the decisions were implemented if their boards were
involved in clarifying issues, 64% said the decisions were implemented if their boards
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were involved in generating alternatives, 79% said the decisions were implemented if
their boards were involved in evaluating alternatives, and 71% said the decisions were
implemented if their boards were involved in choosing alternatives. Looking across the
five decision stages, 71% of the CEOs’ responses were something greater than zero as the
percentage typically implemented. The average percentage of the decisions the CEOs
said were typically implemented when their boards were involved in one or more of the
decision stages was 68%. These data from the board members and the CEOs therefore
provide support for Hypothesis 7.
Hypothesis 8: When boards participate in one or more of the stages of
strategic decision making by raising issues, clarifying issues, generating or
evaluating alternatives, or choosing strategies, the implemented strategic
decisions are more likely to result in positive financial outcomes.
The analysis of the data relating to the financial outcomes of implemented
decisions resulted in a highly significant estimate (19.399, p<.001), providing strong
support for Hypothesis 8.
Again for an independent perspective, I also asked the CEOs on the Hospital CEO
Survey to tell me the typical financial outcomes of implemented decisions if their boards
were involved at each decision stage. Thirty-six percent (36%) of the CEOs responded
that the financial outcomes were positive if their boards were involved in raising issues,
43% said the financial outcomes were positive if their boards were involved in clarifying
issues, 50% said the financial outcomes were positive if their boards were involved in
generating alternatives, 64% said the financial outcomes were positive if their boards
were involved in evaluating alternatives, and 57% said the financial outcomes were
positive if their boards were involved in choosing alternatives. Looking across the five
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decision stages, 50% of the CEOs’ responses indicated neutral financial outcomes and
50% indicated positive outcomes. No CEOs indicated negative financial outcomes.
These data from the CEOs therefore provide additional support for Hypothesis 8. Table
11 shows the percentages of the CEOs’ responses at each point on the scale from
negative 5 indicating the extreme negative end of the scale to positive 5 indicating the
extreme positive end of the scale.
The analysis of these data indicates that the involvement of board members in the
strategic decision making process mediates the relationship between the human capital
and social capital of board members and the financial outcomes of the implemented
decisions. I performed additional analyses of this mediation to determine whether it
represented full or partial mediation by including direct paths from human capital to
financial outcomes and from social capital to financial outcomes. These additional
analyses revealed that involvement in strategic decision making represents partial rather
than full mediation since the direct paths from human capital and social capital to
financial outcomes were also significant.
Figure 14 is a graphical depiction of the model showing all five supported
hypotheses with their estimated path weights. Table 12 summarizes the standardized
regression weights for the paths related to all eight hypotheses. Table 13 provides the
means and standard deviations of the variables in the study, and Table 14 provides the
correlations among the variables in the study.
This chapter presented the results of the analyses of the data using structural
equation modeling. The next chapter provides a discussion of these findings and the
practical implications.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

By looking at boards as strategy makers, this study expands our understanding of
the role of boards in forming strategy for their organizations rather than acting only in
their traditional roles as monitors or advisors. The results of the surveys of board
members and chief executive officers show that some board members are involved in
forming strategy, evidenced by their participation in the stages of strategic decision
making including raising issues, clarifying issues, generating alternatives, evaluating
alternatives, and making choices. These board members are indeed directly involved in
forming strategy rather than being relegated to the periphery of the decision making
process when they only review the CEO’s recommendations and accept or reject those
recommendations.
This study shows that when board members bring greater human capital or social
capital to the boardroom, they are significantly more likely to be involved in forming
organizational strategy. When board members bring more human capital and social
capital in concert, this Board Capital implies an even greater likelihood that they will be
involved in forming strategy than when they bring either form of capital alone. These
forms of capital increase the capabilities of board members to act as strategy makers
rather than serving only as monitors or advisors.
These hospital board members and CEOs have also shown that strategic decisions
are more often implemented when board members have participated directly in making
them. Board members have the opportunity to be more thoroughly familiar with the
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issues and context when they participate early in the stages of strategic decision making,
and this familiarity will lead to a deeper understanding of the appropriateness of the
strategy for a given situation. When board members recognize a match between the
strategy and the situation, they are more likely to approve implementation of the strategy.
One could ask “So what?” The crucial piece of this equation is that the results of
the board member and CEO surveys in this study have also shown a strong positive
relationship between the implemented decisions and their financial outcomes when board
members are involved in the early stages of strategic decision making. Savvy CEOs will
recognize the importance of tapping into this valuable resource by creating opportunities
for board members to participate early in the strategic decision making process rather
than attempting to “manage” their boards into unthinkingly following the CEOs’
recommendations. Savvy CEOs will also seek the counsel of their board members
whenever strategic decisions are under consideration and will communicate information
fully and freely to their boards in order to enhance their board members’ capacity to
apply their knowledge and skills to the specific situation at hand. These respondents
have shown that board members, as a result of their human capital and social capital,
bring insights to the process of forming organizational strategy that pay off in terms of
the financial outcomes of those strategies. Although many other factors can intercede
between individual strategic decisions and overall organizational performance, it is
reasonable to think that an overall pattern of implementing effective decisions will flow
through to improve overall organizational performance.
The results of this study have shown that the involvement of board members in
the strategic decision making process partially mediates the link between the human
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capital, social capital, or Board Capital they bring to the organization and the financial
outcomes of the decisions they make. That is, the human capital and social capital of the
board members have some direct influence on the financial outcomes of strategic
decisions, but it is the board member involvement in forming strategy that has a highly
significant positive effect on the financial outcomes of the decisions. So organizations
that focus attention on ensuring that their boards are comprised of individuals with
human capital and social capital still fall short of recognizing the true value of their
boards when compared to organizations that not only form these capable boards but also
ensure the involvement of their boards early in the strategic decision making process.
The respondents clearly indicated a highly significant relationship between the
forms of capital and the involvement of board members directly in the strategic decision
making process, evidenced by their efforts in raising and clarifying issues, and
generating, evaluating, and choosing alternatives. On the other hand, the presence of
more human capital, social capital, or Board Capital was not related to the board
members’ perceptions of the primary focus for their boards. It is noteworthy that these
board members did not simply respond that their boards were highly focused on all three
of the primary roles for hospital boards. These boards do have different degrees of focus
on the roles within their hospitals. But it appears that the overall focus of the hospital
board is being determined by factors other than the human capital, social capital or Board
Capital the members bring to the boardroom. It could be that the primary focus for the
board is mandated by higher levels of governance within hospital systems or at the
corporate level for investor-owned hospitals. The primary focus of the board may also be
based on the historical focus of the board or on public demands. So essentially boards
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may be more highly focused on building relationships with the external community or
overseeing the performance of the top management team rather than on establishing the
strategic direction of the hospital for reasons like these regardless of the human capital or
social capital that the board members bring to their organizations.
The limitations of this study invite future research in several areas. Board
members and CEOs who are currently making decisions within the contexts of twentytwo hospitals in one state in the southeastern United States participated in this study so
we should be cautious about generalizing these results to all hospitals or to other types of
organizations. Future research that includes responses from a larger sample of people
making decisions in hospitals and other organizations in other parts of the United States
or the world would add confidence that the conclusions of this study are appropriate in
other geographical and organizational contexts. Respondents in this study reflected on
strategic decisions they had participated in making in the past in order to resolve
confidentiality concerns and to incorporate lag time between the time the decisions were
made and when they were implemented and between the implementation of the decisions
and the financial outcomes of the implementation. This approach has obvious benefits;
however, incorporating this lag time also leads to potential problems of inaccurate recall
of events that took place some time ago. Future research that addresses decisions being
made by board members at the present time will likely provide additional insights.
Furthermore, additional insights will undoubtedly be gleaned from researchers observing
first hand the decision making process as it takes place in the boardroom rather than
relying on survey instruments.

72

Practical Implications
The results of research studies often provide information about factors that may
lead to improved organizational performance, but these factors are then not under the
control of organizational members or are simply not actionable. This is not the case with
this study. Rather, this study has a number of practical implications, suggesting several
steps that the committees charged with nominating board members can take in their
organizations to improve the outcomes of strategic decisions.
The results of this study suggest that selecting board members who bring human
capital to the decision making process will be more likely to aid the organization in
forming strategy. This human capital may be in the form of board-level service or work
and educational experience, all of which can be ascertained by those charged with
nominating board members. The results of this study provide even more guidelines,
however, beyond the board, work, and educational experience of potential board
members. These results show that the most important characteristics in determining
board members’ human capital is long tenure on other boards on which the individual is
currently serving, exposure to different competitive strategies through other board service
currently and in the past, and experience with competitive strategies in the individual’s
home firm. Therefore, nominating committees can narrow their focus to selecting board
members who have more years serving on their current boards and more diverse
experience with competitive strategies rather than necessarily attempting to find
individuals with all of the components of human capital as it is defined here. That is, the
results of this study indicate these are more important sources of human capital than are
longer tenure on boards in the past, business-related backgrounds, or more education.
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Similarly, board members who bring more social capital to the decision making
process will be more likely to be involved early in the strategic decision making process.
Social capital in the form of networks with other board members and collaborative
relationships with the organization’s executives is an important consideration. Once
again, however, the results of this study indicate even more finely-tuned actions that
nominating committees may take. The results of this study indicate that the most
important forms of social capital are long tenure on the focal board and collaborative
relationships with their CEOs, relationships where board members freely offer advice and
CEOs frequently seek their counsel. These are observable characteristics that can be
assessed as part of the process of selecting individuals to serve on the board.
The findings of this study not only have ramifications in terms of selecting
individuals to serve on the board but also on board policies and processes. Since longer
tenure on boards is an important antecedent to board member involvement in strategic
decision making, board policies that restrict the number of years an individual may serve
on the focal board are potentially doing more harm than good. Similarly, board policies
that restrict the number of other boards on which the individual is currently serving may
negatively affect the board member’s ability to participate in the decision making
process. Also board policies that attempt to structure board composition to maintain as
much board member independence from management as possible may be sacrificing
board member effectiveness in strategic decision making that comes as a result of
collaborative relationships with management.
This study suggests that board processes should also be designed to enhance
opportunities for board members to offer advice freely and for CEOs to seek the advice
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and counsel of their boards. Friendship ties among board members and between board
members and their CEOs are more important in these findings than the number of formal
board meetings for example. Board retreats and other mechanisms for creating
opportunities for the exchange of ideas outside of formal board meetings are examples of
these board processes, and this study provides evidence that these opportunities are
important to the strategic decision making process and its outcomes.
The results of this study have also shown that selecting board members with both
human capital and social capital, or Board Capital, is better still in terms of the
involvement of the board in forming organizational strategy. Therefore, focusing on
individuals who bring more tenure on the focal board and other boards currently, more
experience with competitive strategies, and a disposition to share a collaborative
relationship with organizational executives will have the best potential for setting the
stage for more involvement by board members in the strategic decision making process.
This greater involvement by board members in forming strategy then increases
the potential for strategies to be implemented and for these implemented strategies to
have positive financial outcomes. Such outcomes are certainly worthy of considerable
attention in the process of nominating and selecting board members. An organizational
strategic decision making process that too often results in a lot of talk and no action is a
waste of some of the most valuable resources for any organization: the time and intellect
of the individuals involved in meetings and discussions about plans that never come to
fruition. This study provides evidence that basing selections of board members on the
specific forms of human capital and social capital they will bring to the organizational
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strategic decision making process will enhance the opportunities for the organization to
attain such outcomes as implementing more – and more effective – strategic decisions.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
This study took an in-depth look at the inner workings of decision making that is
taking place in the boardrooms of hospitals today. People who are currently making
these decisions reflected on actual decisions they have participated in making for their
hospitals and provided details of the decision making process for these real decisions.
Rather than coming into the strategic decision making process only at the end to either
approve or reject the CEO’s recommendations, these board members indicated they are
involved in raising issues, generating alternatives, and the other early stages of the
process as well. When they have human capital (particularly in the form of longer tenure
on other boards and experience with diverse competitive strategies) or social capital
(particularly in the form of longer tenure on the focal board and collaborative
relationships with their CEOs), or better yet, when they have Board Capital (both human
capital and social capital in concert), these board members are capable of participating
directly in forming strategy for their hospitals. And they do. And when they are directly
involved, the decisions are more likely to be implemented and the financial outcomes
associated with the implemented decisions are more likely to be positive.
Board members are important boundary spanners for organizations and as such
are crucial resources. Their experiences with decision making at the board level – at the
apex of the organization – and their experiences with the competitive strategies of their
home organizations and other organizations for which they serve on the board mean that
board members come to the focal board with experiences that are valuable resources in
the strategic decision making process. Their abilities to draw upon their networks with
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others serving as board members and collaborate with the management team of the focal
organization puts board members in the position to offer sound advice in the strategic
decision making process, another valuable resource. Board members are important
conduits for gaining access to information, experiences with strategic options, and
connections in the organization’s environment.
This dissertation opened with a quote from the book Inside the Boardroom (2005)
in which authors Richard Leblanc and James Gillies suggest that we have learned
relatively little over the last century about the ways board members make decisions.
These respondents have provided important illumination of what happens inside the
boardroom. This study has also shown that there are identifiable antecedents and positive
consequences of boards acting as strategy makers.
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Table 1. Research Variables and Associated Survey Items
RESEARCH
VARIABLES

SURVEY ITEMS

Human capital:
Board experience

Approximately how long (total years combined) have you
been a member of the hospital boards you are currently
serving on? For example, if you have served on one
board for 2 years and another board for 5 years, you
would answer 7 total years combined here.
Approximately how long (total years combined) have you
been a member of the non-hospital boards you are
currently serving on?
Approximately how long (total years combined) were you
a member of the hospital boards in the past?
Approximately how long (total years combined) were you
a member of these non-hospital boards in the past?

Work/educational
experience

Please indicate which one of the following best describes
your primary functional background (if you are retired,
please indicate your prior primary functional
background):
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
l.
m.
n.
o.

_____medicine
_____healthcare organization administration
_____finance
_____accounting
_____marketing
_____planning
_____human resources
_____law
_____information systems
_____general management
_____international management
_____public affairs
_____religious
_____agriculture
_____other (please describe)
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Table 1. Continued
RESEARCH
VARIABLES

SURVEY ITEMS

Human capital:
Work/educational
experience (cont.)

Please indicate your highest educational degree:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

_____less than high school
_____high school
_____associate degree (major:
)
_____undergraduate degree (major:
)
_____master degree (major:
)
_____graduate degree above master:
(1) please specify type (M.D., Ph.D., etc.):
(2) please specify specialty or major area:

Organizations can take different approaches to making
changes in their products and services. What is your
experience with these different approaches? No approach
is inherently good or bad.
ORGANIZATION A maintains a “niche” within
its industry by offering a relative stable set of
products/services. Generally Organization A is not
at the forefront of new products/services and
concentrates instead on doing the best job possible
in its existing arena.
ORGANIZATION B maintains a relatively stable
base of products/services while at the same time
moving to meet selected, promising new
product/service developments. Organization B
monitors the actions of other organizations that are
“first movers” and attempts to follow with a more
cost-efficient or well-conceived product/service.
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Table 1. Continued
RESEARCH
VARIABLES

SURVEY ITEMS

Human capital:
Work/educational
experience (cont.)

ORGANIZATION C makes relatively frequent
changes in its set of products/services.
Organization C tries to be the “first mover” with
new products/services and responds rapidly to
early signals of market needs and opportunities.
ORGANIZATION D cannot be clearly
characterized in terms of its approach to changing
its products/services. It does not have a consistent
pattern.
Which organization above is most similar to your “home”
organization (the organization where you are currently
employed or where you were employed before
retirement)?
Organization _____ (A, B, C, or D)
If you currently serve on other boards, do any of those
organizations resemble:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Organization A
Organization B
Organization C
Organization D

_____
_____
_____
_____

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

_____
_____
_____
_____

No
No
No
No

If you served on other boards in the past, did any of those
organizations resemble:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Organization A
Organization B
Organization C
Organization D
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_____
_____
_____
_____

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

_____
_____
_____
_____

No
No
No
No

Table 1. Continued
RESEARCH
VARIABLES

SURVEY ITEMS

Social capital:
Networks

How many other hospital boards are you currently serving
on?
How many non-hospital boards are you currently serving
on?
How many other hospital boards have you served on in the
past?
How many non-hospital boards have you served on in the
past?
I consider 50% or more of the other board members to be
personal friends of mine (strongly disagree=1; strongly
agree=5)
How long have you been a member of this hospital board?

Collaborative
relationship with
CEO

How many times per year does the full board meet?
I frequently meet with the CEO to discuss hospital
business outside of board meetings (strongly disagree=1;
strongly agree=5)
I consider the CEO to be a personal friend of mine
(strongly disagree=1; strongly agree=5)
Board members frequently offer advice to the CEO about
important decisions (strongly disagree=1; strongly
agree=5)
The CEO frequently seeks advice from board members
when making important decisions (strongly disagree=1;
strongly agree=5)
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Table 1. Continued
RESEARCH
VARIABLES
Board Involvement
in Strategy Formation

SURVEY ITEMS

Please think about a major strategic decision that has been
considered at your hospital during your time on the board.
Such a decision would have a long-term impact that affects
the entire or very nearly the entire hospital, usually
involves a large investment of time, money, and energy,
and has large potential consequences. Examples of major
strategic decisions would be deciding to focus on cancer
treatment by opening a cancer center or deciding to
consolidate pediatric services with another hospital in a
cooperative arrangement.
Focusing on this example, indicate your participation in
this decision. Check as many of these activities as
appropriate.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Board Focus

_____raising the issue initially
_____clarifying the issue
_____generating alternatives
_____evaluating alternatives
_____choosing alternatives
_____reviewing/questioning the CEO’s
recommendation
_____accepting or rejecting the CEO’s
recommendation

Many would agree that hospital boards fulfill three roles:
establishing the hospital's mission and strategic direction,
building and maintaining external relationships, and
overseeing the hospital's management team and
performance. Hospital boards can take different strategic
approaches to their own focus and involvement when
guiding the hospital. For example, boards can focus to a
low, medium, or high degree on each of these roles. No
strategic approach is inherently good or bad.
How would you characterize this hospital board's focus on:
a. establishing the hospital's mission and strategic direction
(low, medium, or high)

104

Table 1. Continued
RESEARCH
VARIABLES
Board Focus

SURVEY ITEMS

b. building and maintaining external relationships
(low, medium, or high)
c. overseeing the hospital’s management team and
performance (low, medium, or high)

Performance Outcomes:
Decisions
implemented

Was this strategic decision implemented by your hospital?
Considering strategic decisions in your hospital generally,
what percentage of the decisions are typically
implemented if your hospital board participates in:
a. raising the issue initially (percentage from 0 to
100)
b. clarifying the issue (percentage from 0 to 100)
c. generating alternatives (percentage from 0 to
100)
d. evaluating alternatives (percentage from 0 to
100)
e. choosing alternatives (percentage from 0 to
100)
f. reviewing/questioning the CEO’s
recommendation
(percentage from 0 to 100)
g. accepting or rejecting the CEO’s
recommendation
(percentage from 0 to 100)

Financial outcomes

What were the financial outcomes of the implemented
decision on the following scale: (eleven point scale from
-5 = negative to +5 = positive)
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Table 2. Summary of Hospitals Represented in Sample

DESCRIPTION

Number of Participants

BOARD
MEMBER
SAMPLE
30

CEO
SAMPLE

COMBINED
SAMPLE

14

44

Number of Hospitals
Represented

15

14

22

Percentage of
Hospitals in State

13%

12%

19%
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Table 3. Demographics of Participating Board Members

DEMOGRAPHIC

BOARD
MEMBERS

Male
Female

26
4

PERCENTAGE
OF
SAMPLE
87%
13%

Black/African American
White
Not reported

1
28
1

3%
93%
3%

Highest Degree:
Associate
Undergraduate
Master
M.D.
Ph.D.
J.D.

1
14
3
9
1
2

3%
47%
10%
30%
3%
7%

2
7
9
8
4

7%
23%
30%
27%
13%

Age:
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
70-79
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Table 4. Tenure of Participating Board Members on Focal Board

YEARS ON
FOCAL BOARD

BOARD
MEMBERS

PERCENTAGE
OF
SAMPLE

16
11
1
0
2

53%
37%
3%
0%
7%

Years on Focal Board:
1-5
6-10
11-15
16-20
21-25
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Table 5. Participation of Board Members in Decision Stages
DECISION STAGES

As Strategy Makers:
raising issues initially
clarifying issues
generating alternatives
evaluating alternatives
choosing alternatives
As Monitors/Advisors:
reviewing and questioning
CEO’s recommendations
accepting or rejecting
CEO’s recommendations
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BOARD
MEMBERS

PERCENTAGE
OF
SAMPLE

4
15
3
18
9

13%
50%
10%
60%
30%

23

77%

21

70%

Table 6. Financial Outcomes
on the Scale
-5 = Very Negative Outcomes to +5 = Very Positive Outcomes

SCALE

BOARD
MEMBERS

PERCENTAGE
OF
SAMPLE
3.3%

-5 = very negative outcome

1

-4

0

0

-3

0

0

-2

1

3.3%

-1

1

3.3%

11

37.0%

1

1

3.3%

2

2

6.7%

3

5

16.7%

4

4

13.3%

5 = very positive outcome

4

13.3%

0 = neutral outcome
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Table 7. Percentages of Respondents Reporting Levels of Agreement
with Statements Regarding their Relationships with the CEO
and Other Board Members
STATEMENTS ON BOARD SURVEY
the CEO seeks alternative viewpoints from board
members when making important decisions

RESPONSE SCALEa
SD
D
N
A
SA
10% 3%
47% 40%

board members participate extensively during board
meetings by voicing their viewpoints and concerns

13%

10%

37%

40%

board members frequently offer advice to the CEO
about important decisions

7%

13%

50%

30%

the CEO frequently seeks advice from board members
when making important decisions

3%

23%

40%

33%

I consider the CEO to be a personal friend of mine

7%

20%

47%

27%

40%

23%

27%

7%

37%

20%

27%

17%

I consider 50% or more of the other board members to
be personal friends of mine

3%

I frequently meet with the CEO to discuss hospital
business outside of board meetings
I frequently meet with other board members to discuss
hospital business outside of board meetings

3%

50%

23%

13%

10%

I frequently see the CEO outside of board meetings in
social activities that are not related to the hospital or my
work

7%

37%

17%

30%

10%

27%

23%

43%

7%

I frequently see other board members outside of board
meetings in social activities that are not related to the
hospital or my work
a

SD = Strongly Disagree, D = Disagree, N = Neutral, A = Agree, SA = Strongly Agree
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Table 8. Formative Latent Variables, Indicators,
and Standardized Regression Weights

LATENT
VARIABLES
Human capital:
Board
experience

Work/
educational
experience

FORMATIVE
INDICATORS

ESTIMATE

P

.692

***

number of years serving
on other hospital and nonhospital boards in the past

-.110

N.S.

business-related functional
work background

-.199

**

highest educational degree

-.153

*

experience with multiple
strategic approaches as a
result of serving on other
boards currently and in the
past

-.565

***

experience with the Miles
and Snow Defender,
Analyzer, or Prospector
strategic approaches in the
home firms

.354

***

number of years serving
on other hospital and
non-hospital boards
currently

*** significant at the .001 level; ** significant at the .01 level;
* significant at the .05 level; N.S. = Non-Significant
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Table 8. Continued
LATENT
VARIABLES
Social capital:

ESTIMATE

P

.097

N.S.

-.111

N.S.

.227

**

-.358

***

number of formal board
meetings per year

.075

N.S.

frequently meet with CEO
regarding hospital business
outside of formal board
meetings

.002

N.S.

-.592

***

.443

***

consider the CEO to be a
-.493
personal friend
*** significant at the .001 level; ** significant at the .01 level;
* significant at the .05 level; N.S. = Non-Significant

***

Networks

FORMATIVE
INDICATORS

number of other hospital
and non-hospital boards
currently
number of other hospital
and non-hospital boards in
the past
consider 50% or more of
other members of focal
board to be personal
friends
tenure on focal board

Collaborative
relationship
with CEO

frequently offer advice to
CEO about important
decisions
CEO frequently seeks
advice about important
decisions
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Table 9. Reflective Latent Variables, Indicators,
and Standardized Regression Weights

LATENT
VARIABLES
Board involvement
in strategic decision
making

Board focus

REFLECTIVE
INDICATORS
participate in raising the
issue initially

ESTIMATE

P

.919

***

participate in clarifying the
issue

-.859

***

participate in generating
alternatives

-.888

***

participate in evaluating
alternatives

-.736

***

participate in choosing
alternatives

-.380

*

1.408

***

characterize the board
focus on establishing the
hospital’s mission and
strategic direction

*** significant at the .001 level; ** significant at the .01 level;
* significant at the .05 level; N.S. = Non-Significant
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Table 10. Control Variables
and Standardized Regression Weights

CONTROL
ESTIMATE
P
VARIABLES
Ownership Type
-.002
N.S.
System Affiliation
-.003
N.S.
Hospital Size
-.006
N.S.
*** significant at the .001 level; ** significant at the .01 level;
* significant at the .05 level; N.S. = Non-Significant
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Table 11. Percentage of CEOs Reporting Financial Outcomes
When Board Members are Involved in the Decision Stages
on the Scale -5 = Very Negative Outcomes to +5 = Very Positive Outcomes
DECISION
STAGE
participate in
raising the issue
initially

SCALE
-5 = very negative outcome

PERCENTAGE
OF CEOs
0

-4

0

-3

0

-2

0

-1

0

0 = neutral outcome

64.3%

1

7.1%

2

7.1%

3

7.1%

4

7.1%

5 = very positive outcome

7.1%
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Table 11. Continued
DECISION
STAGE
participate in
clarifying the issue

SCALE
-5 = very negative outcome

PERCENTAGE
OF CEOs
0

-4

0

-3

0

-2

0

-1

0

0 = neutral outcome

57.1%

1

7.1%

2

0

3

21.4%

4

7.1%

5 = very positive outcome

7.1%
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Table 11. Continued
DECISION
STAGE
participate in
generating
alternatives

SCALE
-5 = very negative outcome

PERCENTAGE
OF CEOs
0

-4

0

-3

0

-2

0

-1

0

0 = neutral outcome
1

50.0%
0

2

21.4%

3

14.3%

4

7.1%

5 = very positive outcome

7.1%
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Table 11. Continued
DECISION
STAGE
participate in
evaluating
alternatives

SCALE
-5 = very negative outcome

PERCENTAGE
OF CEOs
0

-4

0

-3

0

-2

0

-1

0

0 = neutral outcome

35.7%

1

7.1%

2

14.3%

3

28.6%

4

7.1%

5 = very positive outcome

7.1%
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Table 11. Continued
DECISION
STAGE
participate in
choosing
alternatives

SCALE
-5 = very negative outcome

PERCENTAGE
OF CEOs
0

-4

0

-3

0

-2

0

-1

0

0 = neutral outcome

42.9%

1

14.3%

2

14.3%

3

14.3%

4

7.1%

5 = very positive outcome

7.1%
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Table 12. Standardized Regression Weights for Paths Related to Hypotheses
HYPOTHESIS

PATH

ESTIMATE

H1

Human capital → Involvement

H2

Human capital → Focus

H3

Social capital → Involvement

H4
H5

P

.804

***

-.063

N.S.

.593

***

Social capital → Focus

-.305

*

1.397

***

-.368

***

H7

Human capital + Social capital →
Involvement
Human capital + Social capital →
Focus
Involvement → Implemented

N/A

N/A

H8

Involvement → Financial Outcomes

H6

19.399

***

*** significant at the .001 level; ** significant at the .01 level;
* significant at the .05 level; N.S. = Non-Significant
N/A = Not Available since 100% of the decisions were implemented (i.e., constant)
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Table 13. Means and Standard Deviations of Variables
in the Studya
VARIABLE
Number of years on other boards currently
Number of years on other boards in past
Business-related functional work backgroundb
Highest educational degreec
Experience with strategic approaches on boardsd
Experience with strategic approaches at home firme
Number of other boards currently
Number of other boards in past
Consider ≥50% of focal board members to be friendsf
Tenure on focal board
Number of formal board meetings per year
Frequently meet with CEO outside of board meetingsf
Frequently offer advice to CEOf
CEO frequently seeks advicef
Consider CEO to be friendf
Participate in raising the issue initiallyg
Participate in clarifying the issueg
Participate in generating alternativesg
Participate in evaluating alternativesg
Participate in choosing alternativesg
Characterize board focus on strategic directionh
Strategic decision implementedi
Financial outcomesj
Ownershipk
System affiliationg
Sizel
a

M.
13.367
11.733
.533
4.867
1.700
1.967
1.567
2.033
2.930
6.130
9.270
3.230
4.030
4.030
3.930
.130
.500
.100
.600
.300
2.370
1.000
7.600
1.970
.730
258.630

S.D.
15.971
15.744
.507
1.008
1.822
.183
1.654
2.205
1.048
5.144
3.473
1.135
.850
.850
.868
.346
.509
.305
.498
.466
.718
.000
2.430
.718
.450
148.961

n=30
business-related = 1; other = 0
c
less than high school = 1 through M.D./Ph.D./J.D. = 6
d
no experience with Miles/Snow four strategy types = 0 through experience with all = 4
e
similar to Miles/Snow “reactor” strategy = 1; otherwise = 2
f
strongly disagree = 1 through strongly agree = 5
g
no = 0; yes = 1
h
low = 1; medium = 2; high = 3
i
all decisions were implemented (constant) so cannot be computed
j
-5 (very negative outcome) = 1 through +5 (very positive outcome) = 11
k
non-governmental not-for-profit = 1; investor-owned = 2; governmental = 3
l
number of staffed beds
b
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Table 14. Correlations Among Variables
in the Studya
VARIABLE
1
1. Number of years on other boards currently
2. Number of years on other boards in past
.442*
3. Business-related functional work background
.162
4. Highest educational degree
-.123
5. Experience with strategic approaches on boards
.481**
6. Experience with strategic approaches at home firm
-.220
7. Number of other boards currently
.689**
8. Number of other boards in past
.383*
9. Consider ≥50% of focal board members to be friends
-.038
10. Tenure on focal board
.105
11. Number of formal board meetings per year
.189
12. Frequently meet with CEO outside of board meetings
-.134
13. Frequently offer advice to CEO
.136
14. CEO frequently seeks advice
.047
15. Consider CEO to be friend
-.003
16. Participate in raising the issue initially
.372*
17. Participate in clarifying the issue
-.265
18. Participate in generating alternatives
-.093
19. Participate in evaluating alternatives
.162
20. Participate in choosing alternatives
.128
21. Characterize board focus on strategic direction
-.063
22. Strategic decision implementedb
23. Financial outcomes
-.232
24. Ownership
.217
25. System affiliation
-.308
26. Size
.154
a
n=30; ** significant at the .01 level; * significant at the .05 level
b
all decisions were implemented (constant) so cannot be computed
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2

3

.161
-.078
.265
.069
.279
.698**
-.083
.439*
.313
-.332
.191
.341
-.044
.222
.009
.243
-.089
-.092
-.073

-.800**
.142
.199
.120
.138
-.061
.368*
.151
-.283
-.043
-.043
-.073
.170
-.134
.312
.055
.029
-.177

.155
.161
-.419*
-.228

.067
-.233
-.111
-.094

Table 14. Continued
VARIABLE
4
1. Number of years on other boards currently
2. Number of years on other boards in past
3. Business-related functional work background
4. Highest educational degree
5. Experience with strategic approaches on boards
-.041
6. Experience with strategic approaches at home firm
-.212
7. Number of other boards currently
.006
8. Number of other boards in past
.049
9. Consider ≥50% of focal board members to be friends
-.302
10. Tenure on focal board
-.316
11. Number of formal board meetings per year
-.088
12. Frequently meet with CEO outside of board meetings
.058
13. Frequently offer advice to CEO
-.196
14. CEO frequently seeks advice
-.035
15. Consider CEO to be friend
-.168
16. Participate in raising the issue initially
-.145
17. Participate in clarifying the issue
.202
18. Participate in generating alternatives
-.291
19. Participate in evaluating alternatives
-.041
20. Participate in choosing alternatives
.015
21. Characterize board focus on strategic direction
-.025
22. Strategic decision implementedb
23. Financial outcomes
-.107
24. Ownership
.279
25. System affiliation
.071
26. Size
.122
a
n=30; ** significant at the .01 level; * significant at the .05 level
b
all decisions were implemented (constant) so cannot be computed
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5

6

.073
.733**
.518**
-.336
-.058
.013
-.182
-.305
-.105
-.405*
.175
-.130
.118
.205
.231
-.097

-.049
.003
.168
-.032
-.149
.039
.230
.230
.421*
.073
-.186
.062
-.152
.122
.096

.003
.097
-.101
.120

.513**
-.272
.308
-.021

Table 14. Continued
VARIABLE
7
1. Number of years on other boards currently
2. Number of years on other boards in past
3. Business-related functional work background
4. Highest educational degree
5. Experience with strategic approaches on boards
6. Experience with strategic approaches at home firm
7. Number of other boards currently
8. Number of other boards in past
.477**
9. Consider ≥50% of focal board members to be friends
-.097
10. Tenure on focal board
-.098
11. Number of formal board meetings per year
.189
12. Frequently meet with CEO outside of board meetings
-.165
13. Frequently offer advice to CEO
-.014
14. CEO frequently seeks advice
.060
15. Consider CEO to be friend
-.141
16. Participate in raising the issue initially
.104
17. Participate in clarifying the issue
-.225
18. Participate in generating alternatives
-.116
19. Participate in evaluating alternatives
.326
20. Participate in choosing alternatives
.398*
21. Characterize board focus on strategic direction
-.123
b
22. Strategic decision implemented
23. Financial outcomes
-.139
24. Ownership
.103
25. System affiliation
-.161
26. Size
.094
a
n=30; ** significant at the .01 level; * significant at the .05 level
b
all decisions were implemented (constant) so cannot be computed
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8

9

-.268
.261
.242
-.320
-.093
.183
-.233
.265
.108
.200
.169
.057
.014

.040
-.165
.303
.467**
.119
.601**
-.165
-.129
-.086
.013
-.169
.125

.125
.153
-.373*
-.077

-.079
-.461*
.327
-.058

Table 14. Continued
VARIABLE
10
1. Number of years on other boards currently
2. Number of years on other boards in past
3. Business-related functional work background
4. Highest educational degree
5. Experience with strategic approaches on boards
6. Experience with strategic approaches at home firm
7. Number of other boards currently
8. Number of other boards in past
9. Consider ≥50% of focal board members to be friends
10. Tenure on focal board
11. Number of formal board meetings per year
.098
12. Frequently meet with CEO outside of board meetings
-.041
13. Frequently offer advice to CEO
.164
14. CEO frequently seeks advice
.291
15. Consider CEO to be friend
.002
16. Participate in raising the issue initially
.358
17. Participate in clarifying the issue
.185
18. Participate in generating alternatives
.716**
19. Participate in evaluating alternatives
.277
20. Participate in choosing alternatives
.012
21. Characterize board focus on strategic direction
.052
b
22. Strategic decision implemented
23. Financial outcomes
.236
24. Ownership
-.148
25. System affiliation
-.357
26. Size
-.005
a
n=30; ** significant at the .01 level; * significant at the .05 level
b
all decisions were implemented (constant) so cannot be computed
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11

-.086
.312
.335
-.165
.113
-.273
-.026
.004
.183
.111
-.016
.543**
-.483**
-.452*

12

.385*
.242
.471**
.094
.090
.129
.110
.189
.357
.173
-.075
.059
.276

Table 14. Continued
VARIABLE
13
1. Number of years on other boards currently
2. Number of years on other boards in past
3. Business-related functional work background
4. Highest educational degree
5. Experience with strategic approaches on boards
6. Experience with strategic approaches at home firm
7. Number of other boards currently
8. Number of other boards in past
9. Consider ≥50% of focal board members to be friends
10. Tenure on focal board
11. Number of formal board meetings per year
12. Frequently meet with CEO outside of board meetings
13. Frequently offer advice to CEO
14. CEO frequently seeks advice
.618**
15. Consider CEO to be friend
.610**
16. Participate in raising the issue initially
.102
17. Participate in clarifying the issue
-.040
18. Participate in generating alternatives
-.013
19. Participate in evaluating alternatives
.195
20. Participate in choosing alternatives
.148
21. Characterize board focus on strategic direction
.374*
22. Strategic decision implementedb
23. Financial outcomes
.290
24. Ownership
.115
25. System affiliation
-.337
26. Size
-.095
a
n=30; ** significant at the .01 level; * significant at the .05 level
b
all decisions were implemented (constant) so cannot be computed
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14

15

.423*
.102
-.199
-.013
-.049
.061
.262

.031
-.078
-.104
.016
.136
.262

.357
.115
-.337
.013

.183
-.280
.129
.133

Table 14. Continued
VARIABLE
16
1. Number of years on other boards currently
2. Number of years on other boards in past
3. Business-related functional work background
4. Highest educational degree
5. Experience with strategic approaches on boards
6. Experience with strategic approaches at home firm
7. Number of other boards currently
8. Number of other boards in past
9. Consider ≥50% of focal board members to be friends
10. Tenure on focal board
11. Number of formal board meetings per year
12. Frequently meet with CEO outside of board meetings
13. Frequently offer advice to CEO
14. CEO frequently seeks advice
15. Consider CEO to be friend
16. Participate in raising the issue initially
17. Participate in clarifying the issue
.196
18. Participate in generating alternatives
.523**
19. Participate in evaluating alternatives
.120
20. Participate in choosing alternatives
.385*
21. Characterize board focus on strategic direction
.074
b
22. Strategic decision implemented
23. Financial outcomes
.025
24. Ownership
.296
25. System affiliation
-.429*
26. Size
-.092
a
n=30; ** significant at the .01 level; * significant at the .05 level
b
all decisions were implemented (constant) so cannot be computed
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17

18

.333
.272
.073
.047

.272
.267
-.016

.084
.142
-.302
.028

.149
-.142
-.302
-.102

Table 14. Continued

VARIABLE
19
1. Number of years on other boards currently
2. Number of years on other boards in past
3. Business-related functional work background
4. Highest educational degree
5. Experience with strategic approaches on boards
6. Experience with strategic approaches at home firm
7. Number of other boards currently
8. Number of other boards in past
9. Consider ≥50% of focal board members to be friends
10. Tenure on focal board
11. Number of formal board meetings per year
12. Frequently meet with CEO outside of board meetings
13. Frequently offer advice to CEO
14. CEO frequently seeks advice
15. Consider CEO to be friend
16. Participate in raising the issue initially
17. Participate in clarifying the issue
18. Participate in generating alternatives
19. Participate in evaluating alternatives
20. Participate in choosing alternatives
.535**
21. Characterize board focus on strategic direction
.520**
22. Strategic decision implementedb
23. Financial outcomes
.234
24. Ownership
.058
25. System affiliation
-.339
26. Size
.098
a
n=30; ** significant at the .01 level; * significant at the .05 level
b
all decisions were implemented (constant) so cannot be computed
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20

21

.278
.140
.237
-.263
.040

.502**
.292
-.221
.248

Table 14. Continued
VARIABLE
23
1. Number of years on other boards currently
2. Number of years on other boards in past
3. Business-related functional work background
4. Highest educational degree
5. Experience with strategic approaches on boards
6. Experience with strategic approaches at home firm
7. Number of other boards currently
8. Number of other boards in past
9. Consider ≥50% of focal board members to be friends
10. Tenure on focal board
11. Number of formal board meetings per year
12. Frequently meet with CEO outside of board meetings
13. Frequently offer advice to CEO
14. CEO frequently seeks advice
15. Consider CEO to be friend
16. Participate in raising the issue initially
17. Participate in clarifying the issue
18. Participate in generating alternatives
19. Participate in evaluating alternatives
20. Participate in choosing alternatives
21. Characterize board focus on strategic direction
22. Strategic decision implementedb
23. Financial outcomes
24. Ownership
.071
25. System affiliation
-.227
26. Size
-.016
a
n=30; ** significant at the .01 level; * significant at the .05 level
b
all decisions were implemented (constant) so cannot be computed
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24

25

-.669**
-.206

.283

APPENDIX B
Figures
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Board Capital
Board

Human Capital
• Board experience
• Work/educational
experience

Social Capital
• Networks
• Collaborative relationship
with CEO
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Organizational
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Performance

Strategy

Outcomes

Formation

Figure 1. Conceptual Model of the Antecedents and Consequences of
Board Involvement in Strategic Decision Making
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Figure 2. Conceptual Model of Board Capital
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Figure 3. Conceptual Model of Hypothesized Relationships
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Stages of Decision Making
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Figure 4. Conceptual Model of the Stages of Decision Making
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Accept/
Reject

Strategy

Community

Oversight

Figure 5. Conceptual Model of Board Focus
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Figure 6. Graphical Depiction of Hypothesis 1
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Figure 7. Graphical Depiction of Hypothesis 2
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Figure 8. Graphical Depiction of Hypothesis 3
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Figure 9. Graphical Depiction of Hypothesis 4
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Figure 10. Graphical Depiction of Hypothesis 5
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Figure 11. Graphical Depiction of Hypothesis 6
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Figure 12. Graphical Depiction of Hypothesis 7
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Figure 13. Graphical Depiction of Hypothesis 8
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Figure 14. Graphical Depiction of the Five Supported Hypotheses
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